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The dominant theoretical framework for decision-making asserts that people make decisions
by integrating noisy evidence to a threshold. It has recently been shown that in many eco-
logically realistic situations, decreasing the decision boundary maximises the reward available
from decisions. However, empirical support for decreasing boundaries in humans is scant.
To investigate this problem, we used an ideal observer model to identify the conditions under
which participants should change their decision boundaries with time in order to maximize
reward rate. We conducted six expanded-judgement experiments that precisely matched the
assumptions of this theoretical model. In this paradigm participants could sample noisy, binary
evidence presented sequentially. Blocks of trials were fixed in duration and each trial was an
independent reward opportunity. Participants therefore had to trade off speed (getting as many
rewards as possible) against accuracy (sampling more evidence). Having access to the actual
evidence samples experienced by participants enabled us to infer the slope of the decision
boundary. We found that participants indeed modulated the slope of the decision boundary
in the direction predicted by the ideal observer model, although we also observed systematic
deviations from optimality. Participants employing sub-optimal boundaries do so in a robust
manner, so that any error in their boundary setting is relatively inexpensive. The use of a
normative model provides insight into what variable(s) human decision-makers are trying to
optimise. Furthermore, this normative model allowed us to choose diagnostic experiments and
in doing so we present clear evidence for time-varying boundaries.
Keywords: decision-making, decision threshold, decreasing bounds, optimal decisions,
reward-rate
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Introduction
In an early theory of decision-making, Cartwright and
Festinger (1943) modelled decision-making as a struggle be-
tween fluctuating forces. At each instant, the decision-maker
drew a sample from the (Gaussian) distribution for each force
and computed the difference between these samples. This
difference was the resultant force and no decision was made
while the opposing forces were balanced and the resultant
force was zero. Cartwright and Festinger realised that if a de-
cision was made as soon as there was the slightest imbalance
in forces, there would be no advantage to making decisions
more slowly. This was inconsistent with the observation that
the speed of making decisions traded-off with their accuracy,
a property of decision-making that had already been recorded
(Garrett, 1922; Johnson, 1939; Festinger, 1943) and has been
repeatedly observed since (e.g., Howell & Kreidler, 1963;
Pachella, 1974; Wickelgren, 1977; Luce, 1986; Bogacz, Wa-
genmakers, Forstmann, & Nieuwenhuis, 2010). Cartwright
and Festinger addressed the speed-accuracy trade-off by in-
troducing an internal restraining force – also normally dis-
tributed and in the opposite direction to the resultant force
– which would prevent the decision-maker from going off
“half-cocked” (Cartwright & Festinger, 1943, p. 598). The
decision-maker drew samples from this restraining force and
did not make a decision until the resultant force was larger
than these samples. The restraining force was adaptable
and could be adjusted based on whether the decision-maker
wanted to emphasize speed or accuracy in the task.
In the ensuing decades, Cartwright and Festinger’s the-
ory fell out of favour due to several shortcomings (see Ir-
win, Smith, & Mayfield, 1956; Vickers, Nettelbeck, & Will-
son, 1972) and was superseded by the signal detection the-
ory (Tanner & Swets, 1954) and sequential sampling mod-
els (Stone, 1960; LaBerge, 1962; Laming, 1968; Link &
Heath, 1975; Vickers, 1970; Ratcliff, 1978). These models
do not mention a restraining force explicitly, but this concept
is implicit in a threshold, which must be crossed before the
decision-maker indicates their choice. Just as the restrain-
ing force could be adjusted based on the emphasis on speed
or accuracy, these models proposed that the threshold could
be lowered or raised to emphasise speed or accuracy. This
adaptability of thresholds has been a key strength of these
models, a feature that has been used to explain how distri-
bution of response latencies changes when subjects are in-
structed to emphasise speed or accuracy in a decision (for a
review, see Ratcliff & Smith, 2004; Bogacz, Brown, Moehlis,
Holmes, & Cohen, 2006; Ratcliff, Smith, Brown, & McK-
oon, 2016).
Introducing a restraining force or a threshold to explain
the speed-accuracy trade-off answers one question but raises
another: how should a decision-maker select the restraining
force (threshold) for a decision-making problem? Should
this restraining force remain constant during a decision? This
problem was examined by Wald (1947) who proposed that,
for an isolated decision, an optimal decision-maker can dis-
tinguish between two hypotheses by choosing the desired
ratio of Type 1 and Type 2 errors and then using a sta-
tistical procedure called the sequential-probability-ratio-test
(SPRT). In the SPRT, the decision-maker sequentially com-
putes the ratio of the likelihoods of all observations given
the hypotheses and the decision process terminates only once
the ratio exceeds a threshold (corresponding to accepting the
first hypothesis) or decreases below another threshold (corre-
sponding to accepting the second hypothesis). The values of
these thresholds do not change as more samples are accumu-
lated and they determine the accuracy of decisions. Wald and
Wolfowitz (1948) showed that the SPRT requires a smaller
or equal number of observations, on average, than any other
statistical procedure, for a given accuracy of decisions.
The SPRT gives a statistically optimal procedure to set
the threshold for an isolated decision. However, in many
real-world decision problems – a bird foraging for food, a
market trader deciding whether to keep or sell stocks, a pro-
fessor going through a pile of job applications or, indeed,
a psychology undergraduate doing an experiment for course
credits – decisions are not made in isolation; rather, individ-
uals have to make a sequence of decisions. How should one
set the threshold in this situation? Is the optimal threshold
still given by SPRT? If decision-makers accrue a reward from
each decision, an ecologically sensible goal for the decision-
maker may be to maximise the expected reward from these
decisions, rather than to minimise the number of samples re-
quired to make a decision with a given accuracy (as SPRT
does). And for sequences which involve a large number of
decisions or sequence of decisions that do not have a clearly
defined end point, it would make sense for the decision-
maker to maximise the reward-rate, the expected amount of
rewards per unit time. In fact, under certain assumptions, in-
cluding the assumption that every decision in a sequence has
the same difficulty, it can be shown that the two optimisation
criteria – SPRT and reward-rate – result in the same thresh-
old (Bogacz et al., 2006). That is, the decision-maker can
maximise reward-rate by employing the SPRT and maintain-
ing an appropriately chosen threshold that remains constant
within and across trials. Experimental data suggest that peo-
ple do indeed adapt their speed and accuracy to improve their
reward-rate (Bogacz, Hu, Holmes, & Cohen, 2010; Simen et
al., 2009). This adaptability seems to be larger for younger
than older adults (Starns & Ratcliff, 2010, 2012) and seems
to become stronger with practice (Balci et al., 2011) and
guidance (Evans & Brown, 2016).
However, maintaining a fixed and time-invariant thresh-
old across a sequence of trials cannot be the optimal solution
in many ecologically realistic situations where the difficulty
of decisions fluctuates from trial-to-trial. Consider, for ex-
ample, a situation in which there is very little information
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or evidence in favour of the different decision alternatives.
Accumulating little evidence to a fixed threshold might take
a very long time. The decision-maker risks being stuck in
such an impoverished trial because they are unable to choose
between two equally uninformative options, like Buridan’s
donkey (see Lamport, 2012), who risks being starved be-
cause it is unable to choose between two equally palatable
options. Cartwright and Festinger foresaw this problem and
noted that “there is good reason to suppose that the longer the
individual stays in the decision region, the weaker are the re-
straining forces against leaving it” (Cartwright & Festinger,
1943, p. 600). So they speculated that the mean restraining
force should be expressed as a decreasing function of time
but they were not prepared to make specific assumptions as
to the exact nature of this function.
In cases where the restraining force may change with time,
the concept of a fixed threshold may be replaced by a time-
dependent decision boundary between making more obser-
vations and choosing an alternative. A number of recent
studies have mathematically computed the shape of decision
boundaries that maximise reward-rate when decisions in a se-
quence vary in difficulty and shown that the decision-maker
can maximise the reward-rate by decreasing this decision
boundary with time (Drugowitsch, Moreno-Bote, Church-
land, Shadlen, & Pouget, 2012; Huang & Rao, 2013; Moran,
2015). It can also be shown that the shape of the boundary
that maximises reward-rate depends on the mixture of deci-
sion difficulties. Indeed, based on the difficulties of decisions
in a sequence, optimal boundaries may decrease, remain con-
stant or increase (Malhotra, Leslie, Ludwig, & Bogacz, under
review1; also see below).
The goal of this study was to test whether and under
what circumstances, humans vary their decision boundaries
with time during a decision. More generally, we assessed
the relationship between the bounds employed by people
and the optimal bounds – i.e., the boundary that maximises
reward-rate. Importantly, we adopt an experimental ap-
proach that is firmly rooted in a mathematical optimality
analysis (Malhotra et al., under review) and that allows us
to infer the decision boundary relatively directly based on
the sequences of evidence samples actually experienced by
decision makers.
Previous evidence on whether people change decision
boundaries at all during a trial, much less adapt it to be
optimal, is inconclusive. Some evidence of time-dependent
boundaries was found early on in studies that compared par-
ticipant behaviour with Wald’s optimal procedure. These
studies employed an expanded-judgement paradigm in which
the participant makes their decision based on a sequence of
discrete samples or observations presented at discrete times
– e.g., deciding between two deck of cards with different
means based on cards sampled sequentially from the two
decks (see e.g., Irwin et al., 1956; Becker, 1958; Manz,
1970; Busemeyer, 1985; Smith & Vickers, 1989; Vickers,
1995; Pleskac & Busemeyer, 2010). The advantage of this
paradigm is that the experimenter can record not only the
response time and accuracy of the participant, but also the
exact sequence of samples on which they base their deci-
sions. In an expanded-judgement paradigm Pitz, Reinhold,
and Geller (1969) found that participants made decisions at
lower posterior odds when the number of samples increased.
Similar results were reported by Sanders and Linden (1967)
and Wallsten (1968). Curiously, participants seemed to be
disregarding the optimal strategy in these studies, which was
to keep decision boundaries constant. We will discuss below
why this behaviour may be ecologically rational when the
participant has uncertainty about task parameters.
The shape of decision boundaries has been also analysed
in a number of experiments using a paradigm where the sam-
ples drawn by the participant are implicit, i.e., hidden from
the experimenter. In these paradigms, the data recorded is
limited to the response time and accuracy, so one can distin-
guish between constant or variable decision boundaries only
indirectly, by fitting the two models to the data and compar-
ing them. These tasks generally involve detecting a signal in
the presence of noise. Therefore, to distinguish these experi-
ments from the expanded-judgement tasks, we will call them
signal detection tasks. Examples of this paradigm include
lexical decisions (Wagenmakers, Ratcliff, Gomez, & McK-
oon, 2008), basic perceptual discrimination (e.g. brightness;
Ratcliff & Rouder, 1998; Ludwig, Gilchrist, McSorley, &
Baddeley, 2005) and numerosity judgements (Starns & Rat-
cliff, 2012). Pike (1968) analysed data from a number of psy-
chophysical discrimination studies and found that this data is
best explained by the accumulator model (Audley & Pike,
1965) if subjects either vary decision bounds between trials
or decrease bounds during a trial. Additional support for de-
creasing boundaries was found by Drugowitsch et al. (2012)
who analysed data collected by Palmer, Huk, and Shadlen
(2005). Finally, data from non-human primates performing a
random dot motion discrimination task (Roitman & Shadlen,
2002) were best fit by a diffusion model with decreasing
boundaries (Ditterich, 2006).
In contrast to these studies which found evidence favour-
ing decreasing boundaries, Hawkins, Forstmann, Wagen-
makers, Ratcliff, and Brown (2015) analysed data from ex-
periments on human and non-human primates spanning a
range of experiments using signal detection paradigms and
found equivocal support for constant and decreasing bound-
aries. They found that overall evidence, especially in hu-
mans, favoured constant boundaries and that, crucially, ex-
perimental procedures such as the extent of task practice
seemed to play a role in which option was favoured. There-
fore, what seems to be missing is a more systematic analysis
of the conditions under which people decrease the decision
1Manuscript available at https://osf.io/9t76q/
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boundary within a trial and understanding why they would
do so.
In this study, we took a different approach: rather than
infer the decision boundaries indirectly by fitting different
boundaries to explain reaction times and error rates, we used
the expanded-judgement paradigm, where the experimenter
can observe the exact sequence of samples used by the par-
ticipant and record the exact evidence and time used to make
a decision. This evidence and time should lie on the bound-
ary. This allowed us to make a more direct estimate of the
decision boundary used by the participants and compare this
boundary with the optimal boundary. We found that, in gen-
eral, participants modulated their decision boundaries dur-
ing a trial in a manner predicted by the maximisation of
reward-rate. This effect was robust across paradigms and
for decisions that play out over time scales ranging from
several hundreds of milliseconds to several seconds. How-
ever, there were also systematic deviations from optimal be-
haviour. Much like the expanded-judgement tasks discussed
above, in a number of our experiments participants seemed
to decrease their decision boundary even when it was opti-
mal to keep them constant. We mapped these strategies on
to the “reward landscape” predicted by the theoretical model
– i.e. the variation in reward-rate with different settings of
the decision boundary. These analyses suggest that partici-
pants’ choice of decision boundary may be guided not only
by maximising the reward-rate, but also by robustness con-
siderations. That is, they appear to allow for some “error”
in their boundary setting due to uncertainty in task parame-
ters and deviate from optimality in a manner that reduces the
impact of such error.
While it has been argued that the results from an
expanded-judgement task can be generalised to signal detec-
tion paradigms, where sampling is implicit (Irwin & Smith,
1956; Edwards, 1965; Sanders & Linden, 1967; Vickers,
Burt, Smith, & Brown, 1985; Pleskac & Busemeyer, 2010),
these tasks usually use a slow presentation rate and elicit
longer response latencies than those expected for perceptual
decisions. It is possible that attention and memory play a
different role in decision-making at this speed than at faster
speeds at which perceptual decisions occur. To address this
possibility, we adapted the expanded-judgement task to al-
low fast presentation rates and consequently elicit rapid de-
cisions.
The rest of the paper is split into five sections. First, we
summarise the theoretical basis for the relationship between
a boundary and reward-rate. In the next three sections we de-
scribe a series of expanded-judgement tasks, each of which
compares the boundaries employed by participants with the
theoretically optimal boundaries. In the final section we con-
sider the implications of our findings as well as the potential
mechanisms by which time-varying boundaries may be in-
stantiated. Data from all experiments reported in this article
is available online at: https://osf.io/f3vhr/.
Optimal shape of decision boundaries
We now outline how an expanded-judgement task can be
mathematically modelled and how this model can be used to
establish the relationship between the task’s parameters and
decision boundaries that maximise reward-rate. We summa-
rize the key results from a theoretical study of Malhotra et al.
(under review), provide intuition for them, and state predic-
tions that we tested experimentally.
Consider an expanded-judgement task that consists of
making a sequence of decisions, each of which yields a unit
reward if the decision is correct. Each decision (or trial) con-
sists of estimating the true state of the world based on a se-
quence of noisy observations. We consider the simplest pos-
sible case in which the world can be in one of two different
states, call these U p or Down, and each observation of the
world can be one of two different outcomes. Each outcome
provides a fixed amount of evidence, δX, to the decision-
maker about the true state of the world:
δX =
+1 with probability u−1 with probability 1 − u (1)
where u is the up-probability that governs how quickly ev-
idence is accumulated and depends on the true state of the
world. We assume throughout that u ≥ 0.5 when the true
state is U p and u ≤ 0.5 when the true state is Down. Note
that the parameter u will determine the difficulty of a decision
– when u is close to 0.5 the decision will be hard while when
u is close to 0 or 1 the decision will be easy.
Figure 1 illustrates the process of making a decision in this
expanded-judgement task. As assumed in sequential sam-
pling models, decision making involves the accumulation of
the probabilistic evidence, so let x be the cumulative evi-
dence, i.e. the sum of all δX outcomes. The accumulation
continues till x crosses one of two boundaries θ correspond-
ing to the options, so that the decision maker responds U p
when x > θ, and Down when x < −θ. During the expanded-
judgement task described above, the state of the decision-
maker, at any point of time, is defined by the pair (t, x), where
t is the number of observations made. In any given state, the
decision-maker can take one of two actions: (i) make another
observation – we call this action wait, or (ii) signal their es-
timate of the true state of the world – we call this the action
go. As shown in Figure 1, taking an action wait can lead to
one of two transitions: (i) the next observed outcome is +1;
in this case, make a transition to state (t + 1, x + 1), or (ii) the
next observed outcome is −1; in this case, make a transition
to state (t + 1, x − 1). Similarly, taking the action go can also
lead to one of two transitions: (i) the estimated state is the
true state of the world; in this case collect a reward and make
a transition to the Correct state, or (ii) the estimated state is
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not the true state of the world; in this case make a transition
to the Incorrect state. After making a transition to a Correct
or Incorrect state, the decision-maker starts a new decision,
i.e. returns to the state (t, x) = (0, 0) after an inter-trial delay
DC following a correct choice and DI following the incorrect
choice.
Figure 1. Evidence accumulation and decision-making as a
Markov Decision Process: states are shown by circles, tran-
sitions are shown by arrows and actions are shown by colour
of the circles. The solid (blue) line labeled θ indicates a hy-
pothetical decision boundary. The policy that corresponds to
the boundary is indicated by the colour of the states. Black
circles indicate the action go while gray circles indicate wait.
Dashed lines with arrows indicate transitions on go while
solid lines with arrows indicate transitions on wait. The re-
warded and unrewarded states are shown as C and I, respec-
tively (for Correct and Incorrect.)
These set of state-action pairs and transitions between
these states defines a Markov Decision Process (MDP)
shown schematically in Figure 1. In this framework, any
decision boundary which is a function of time, θ = f (t),
can be mapped to a set of actions, such that action wait is
selected for any state within the boundaries and action go for
any state on or beyond the boundaries. The mapping which
assigns actions to all possible states is called a policy for the
MDP.
We assume that a decision maker wishes to maximise the
reward-rate (which we defined as the expected number of re-
wards per unit time). The reward-rate depends on the deci-
sion boundary: If the boundary is too low, the decision maker
will make errors and miss possible rewards, but if it is too
high, each decision will take a long period, and the number
of reward per unit of time will also be low.
The policy that maximises average reward can be obtained
by using a dynamic programming procedure known as pol-
icy iteration (Howard, 1960; Ross, 1983; Puterman, 2005).
Several recent studies describe how dynamic programming
can be applied to decision-making tasks to get a policy that
maximises reward-rate (see e.g., Drugowitsch et al., 2012;
Huang & Rao, 2013; Malhotra et al., under review). We
now summarize how the optimal shape of decision bound-
ary depends on task’s parameters based on the analysis given
in Malhotra et al. (under review). Let us first consider a
class of tasks in which the difficulty of the decisions is fixed.
That is, evidence can point either towards U p or Down, but
the quality of the evidence remains fixed across decisions:
u ∈ { 12 − , 12 + }, with  corresponding to the drift. The
drift can take values in range  ∈ [0, 12 ] and it determines the
difficulty of each trial with higher drift corresponding to eas-
ier trials. For Single-difficulty tasks,  remains fixed across
trials.
In the Single-difficulty tasks, reward-rate can be optimised
by choosing a policy such that the decision boundary remains
constant during each decision. Intuitively, this is because the
decision maker’s estimate of the probability that the world
is in a particular state depends only on integrated evidence
x, but not on time elapsed within the trial t. Therefore the
optimal action to take in each state only depends on x but not
t, so go actions are only taken if x exceeds a particular value,
leading to constant boundaries.
The optimal height of the decision boundary in the Single-
difficulty tasks depends on task difficulty in a non-monotonic
way. For very easy tasks ( close to 12 ) each outcome is a
very reliable predictor of the state of the world, so very few
outcomes need to be seen to obtain an accurate estimate of
the state of the world (Figure 2a). As the difficulty increases,
more outcomes are required, and the optimal boundary in-
creases (compare Figures 2a and 2b). However, when the
task becomes very difficult ( close 0), there is little benefit
in observing the stimulus at all, and for  = 0 the optimal
strategy is not to integrate evidence at all, but guess immedi-
ately, i.e. θ = 0 (compare Figures 2d and 2e).
Let us now consider a Mixed-difficulty task, in which half
of the trials are Easy with drift e and the other half of the tri-
als are Difficult with drift d, where e > d. We assume that
during Mixed-difficulty tasks, the decision-maker knows that
there are two levels of difficulty (either through experience or
instruction), but does not know if a particular trial is easy or
difficult. Indeed, a key assumption of the underlying theory
is that the difficulty level is something the decision maker has
to infer during the accumulation of evidence.
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(f) Mixed (e = 0.20, d = 0.10)
Figure 2. Optimal policies for Single and Mixed-difficulty tasks. Black squares indicate states of the MDP where the optimal
action is to go – i.e., choose an alternative – while gray squares indicate states where the optimal action is to wait – i.e., collect
more evidence. In each row, the two panels on the left show optimal policies for Single-difficulty tasks with two different
levels of difficulty and the right-most panel shows optimal policy for Mixed-difficulty task obtained by mixing the difficulties
is the two left-hand panels. The inter-trial intervals were DC = DI = 70 for the top row (panels (a)–(c)) and DC = DI = 50 for
the bottom row (panels (d)–(f)).
In Mixed-difficulty tasks, reward-rate is optimised by em-
ploying boundaries that may decrease, increase or remain
constant based on the mixture of difficulties. Intuitively, this
is because the decision maker’s estimate of the probability
that the world is in a particular state, given the existing evi-
dence, depends on their inference about the difficulty of the
trial. Time becomes informative in Mixed-difficulty tasks be-
cause it helps the decision-maker infer whether a given trial
is Easy or Difficult and hence the estimate of the true state of
the world depends not only on the evidence, x, but also on
the time, t. The optimal decision-maker should begin each
decision trial assuming the decision could be Easy or Diffi-
cult. Therefore, θ at the beginning of the trial should be in
between the optimal boundaries for the two difficulties. As
they make observations, they will update their estimate of
the task difficulty. In particular, as time within a trial pro-
gresses, and the decision boundary has not been reached, the
estimated probability of the trial being Difficult increases and
the decision boundary moves towards the optimal boundary
for the Difficult trials.
The above principle is illustrated in Figures 2c and 2f
showing optimal boundaries for two sample Mixed-difficulty
tasks. Figure 2f shows the optimal boundary for a task in
which half of the trials have moderate difficulty and half are
very difficult (the optimal bounds for Single-difficulty tasks
with corresponding values of drift are shown in Figures 2d
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and 2e). As the time progresses the optimal decision maker
infers that a trial is likely to be very difficult, so an optimal
strategy involves moving on to the next trial (which may be
easier), i.e. decreasing the decision boundary with time in
the trial.
In contrast, when the boundary for the Difficult task is
higher than the Easy task (the Difficult task is not extremely
hard; Figures 2a and 2b), the optimal boundary in the Mixed-
difficulty task will again start at a value in-between the
boundaries for the Easy and Difficult tasks and approach the
boundary for the Difficult task (Figure 2c). In this case, the
boundary for the Difficult task will be higher than the Easy
task meaning that the optimal boundary will increase with
time.
In summary, the mathematical model makes three key pre-
dictions about the normative behaviour: (i) optimal decision
boundaries should stay constant if all decisions in a sequence
are of the same difficulty, (ii) it is optimal to decrease deci-
sion boundaries if decisions are of mixed difficulty and some
decisions are extremely difficult (or impossible), and (iii) it
may be optimal to keep decision boundaries constant or even
increase them in Mixed-difficulty tasks where the Difficult
decision is not too difficult. In the next three sections, we
compare human behaviour with these normative results.
Experiment 1
In order to compare human behaviour with the norma-
tive behaviour described above, we designed an experi-
ment that involved an evidence-foraging game which par-
allels the expanded-judgement task described in the pre-
vious section. We modelled this evidence-foraging game
on previous expanded-judgement tasks, such as Irwin et al.
(1956) and Vickers, Burt, et al. (1985), where participants
are shown a sequence of discrete observations and required
to judge the distribution from which these observations were
drawn. We modified these expanded-judgement paradigms
so that (i) the observations could have only one of two values
(i.e. drawn from the Bernoulli distribution), (ii) the reward-
structure of the task was based on performance, and (iii) the
task had an intrinsic speed-accuracy trade-off (SAT). We in-
troduced a speed-accuracy trade-off by using a fixed-time
blocks paradigm: the experiment was divided into a num-
ber of games, the total duration for each game was fixed,
and participants could attempt as many decisions as they like
during this period. Therefore, if a participant takes a very
long time for each decision they are likely to be accurate, but
will not be able to complete many decisions during a game.
If a participant decides very quickly, they are likely to per-
form worse in terms of accuracy, but will have more reward
“opportunities” during the game. The goal of the participants
was to collect as much reward as possible during each game,
so they need to find a balance between these two strategies.
In this expanded judgement task, we are able to record
the exact sequence of stimuli presented to the participants
and the position in state-space (t, x) at which participants
made their decisions. Based on the location of these deci-
sions, we inferred how the decision boundary for a partici-
pant depended on time. According to the above theory, the
optimal decision boundary should be independent of time
in Single-difficulty tasks, but could vary with time during
Mixed-difficulty tasks. By comparing the inferred decision
boundary with optimal boundaries in each type of task, we
assessed whether participants adjusted their decision bound-
aries to maximise reward-rate.
Methods
Description of task. Twenty four participants from the
university community were asked to play a set of games on
a computer. The number of participants was chosen to give a
sample size that is comparable to previous human decision-
making studies2 and kept constant during all of our exper-
iments. Each game lasted a fixed duration and participants
made a series of decisions during this time. Correct deci-
sions led to a reward and participants were asked to max-
imise the cumulative reward. The game was programmed us-
ing Matlab R© and Psychtoolbox (Brainard, 1997; Pelli, 1997;
Kleiner et al., 2007) and was played using a computer key-
board. The study lasted approximately fifty minutes, includ-
ing the instruction phase and training.
During each game, participants were shown an animated
creature (pacman) moving along a path (Figure 3). A trial
started with pacman stationary at a fork in the path. At this
point pacman could jump either up or down and the partic-
ipant made this choice using the ‘up’ or ‘down’ arrow keys
on the keyboard. One of these paths contained a reward, but
the participant could not see this before making the decision.
Participants were shown a sequence of cues and they could
wait and watch as many cues as they wanted before making
their choice. The display also showed the total reward they
accumulated in the experiment and a progress bar showing
how much time was left in the current game (not shown in
Figure 3).
Once the participant indicated their choice, an animation
showed pacman moving along the chosen path. If this path
was the rewarded one, a bag with a $ sign appeared along
the path (right panel in Figure 3). When pacman reached this
bag, the reward was added to the total and pacman navigated
to the next next fork and this started the next trial. If the par-
2See, for example, Palmer et al. (2005) who test six partici-
pants with ∼560 trials for each participant and Ratcliff and McKoon
(2008) who test fifteen participants with ∼960 trials per participant.
We used a performance-based reward paradigm (outlined below),
which meant that the number of trials varied between participants
and experiments but were between ∼150 and ∼650 trials per partic-
ipant for each of the experiments reported below.
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(a) During trial
(b) Inter-trial-interval
Figure 3. Two screenshots of the display during the experi-
ment. The left panel shows the display during the evidence-
accumulation phase of a trial. Participants chose whether
pacman goes up or down after seeing a sequence of cues (ar-
rows) pointing up or down. The elephant next to the arrow
indicates that this is an Easy game, so the arrow points to the
reward-holding path with probability 0.70. The right panel
shows a screenshot during the inter-trial interval. The partic-
ipant has chosen the lower path and can now see that this was
the correct (rewarded) decision.
ticipant chose the unrewarded path, the money bag appeared
along the other path.
The inter-trial interval (ITI) started as soon as the partic-
ipant indicated their choice. We manipulated the inter-trial
interval for correct and incorrect decisions by varying pac-
man’s speed. Participants were told that pacman received a
“speed-boost” when it ate the money bag so that inter-trial
interval for correct decisions was smaller than that for in-
correct decisions. Values for all parameters used during the
game are shown in Table 1.
Cue stimuli. When pacman reached a fork, cues were
displayed at a fixed rate, with a new cue every 200ms. We
call this delay the inter-stimulus interval (ISI). During these
200ms, the cue was displayed for 66ms, followed by 134ms
of no cue. Each cue was the outcome of a Bernoulli trial and
consisted of either an upwards or a downwards pointing ar-
row. This arrow indicated the rewarded path with a particular
probability.
Next to the cues, participants were shown a picture of ei-
ther an elephant or a penguin. This animal indicated the type
of game they were playing. One of the two animals pro-
vided cues with a probability 0.70 of being correct, while the
other animal provided cues with a probability 0.50 of being
correct. Thus, the two animals mapped to the two Single-
Parameter name Value
Inter-stimulus interval (ISI) 200 msec
Inter-trial interval, correct (IS I ∗ DC) 3 sec
Inter-trial interval, incorrect (IS I ∗ DI) 10 sec
Reward 2p
Drift for Easy condition (e) 0.20
Drift for Difficult condition (d) 0
Block duration, training 150 secs
Block duration, testing, Easy 240 secs
Block duration, testing, Difficult 300 secs
Block duration, testing, Mixed 300 secs
Table 1
Values of parameters used during the game.
difficulty conditions – Easy (with  = 0.20) or Difficult (with
 = 0) – shown in Figure 2d and 2e. The mapping between
difficulties and animals was counterbalanced across partici-
pants.
We chose the values of up-probability so that the opti-
mal decision boundaries in the Mixed-difficulty case have
the steepest slope, making it easier to detect if participants
decrease decision boundaries. The theory in the previous
section shows that decision boundaries decrease only when
the Difficult decisions are extremely difficult. In the experi-
ment we set the up-probability for Difficult condition to the
extreme value of 0.5, i.e. d = 0 – therefore, the cues do not
give any information on the true state of the world. Using
this value has two advantages: (i) it leads to optimal deci-
sion boundaries in Mixed-difficulty games with the steepest
decrease in slope, and (ii) it makes it easier for participants
to realise that the optimal boundary in the Difficult condi-
tion is very low (in fact, the optimal strategy for Difficult
games is to guess immediately). Optimal boundaries should
also decrease (although with a smaller slope) when decisions
are marginally easier (e.g., d = 0.03). But we found that
participants frequently overweight evidence given by these
low probability cues (perhaps analogous to the overweight-
ing of small probabilities in other risky choice situations,
e.g. Tversky & Kahneman, 1992; Gonzalez & Wu, 1999)
and need a large amount of training to establish the optimal
behaviour in such extremely difficult (but not impossible)
games. In contrast, when d = 0, participants could learn
the optimal strategy Difficult games with a small amount of
training.
The experiment consisted of three types of games: ‘Easy’
games where only the animal giving 70% correct cues ap-
peared at each fork; ‘Difficult’ games where only the animal
giving the 50% cues appeared at the fork and ‘Mixed’ games
where the animal could change from one fork to the next.
Participants were given these probabilities at the start of each
game and also received training on each type of game (see
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‘Structure of experiment’ below). Importantly, during Mixed
games participants were shown a picture of a wall instead of
either animal and told that the animal was hidden behind this
wall. In other words, they received no information indicating
whether a particular trial during a Mixed game was ‘easy’ or
‘difficult’ other than the cues themselves, so that they had to
infer the type of trial based on these cues. This corresponds
to the Mixed-difficulty task shown in Figure 2f.
Reward structure. Participant reimbursement was bro-
ken down into three components. The first component was
fixed and every participant received £6 for taking part in the
study. The second component was the money bags accumu-
lated during the experiment. Each money bag was worth 2p
and participants were told that they could accumulate up to
£5 during the experiment. The third component was a bonus
prize of £20 available to the participant who accumulated the
highest reward during the study. Participants were not told
how much other participants had won until after they took
part in the study.
Structure of experiment. The experiment was divided
into a training phase and a testing phase. Participants were
given training on each type of game. The duration of each
training game was 150 seconds. This phase allowed partici-
pants to familiarise themselves with the games and probabil-
ity of cues as well as understand the speed accuracy trade-off
for each type of games. The reward accumulated during the
training phase did not count towards their reimbursement.
The testing phase consisted of six games, two of each
type. Participants were again reminded of the probabilities
of cues at the start of each game. The order of these games
was counterbalanced across participants so that each type
of game was equally likely to occur in each position in the
sequence of games. The duration of the Easy games was
240 seconds, while the Difficult and Mixed games lasted 300
seconds each. The reason for different durations for differ-
ent types of games was that we wanted to collect around the
same amount of data for each condition. Pilot studies showed
that participants generally have faster reaction time during
the Easy games (see Results below). Therefore, we increased
the length of the Difficult and Mixed blocks. By using these
durations, participants made approximately seventy to ninety
choices during both Easy and Mixed conditions. In the mid-
dle of each game, participants received a 35 seconds break.
Eliminating non-decision time. We preprocessed the
recorded data to eliminate non-decision time – the delay be-
tween making a decision and executing a response. Due to
this non-decision time, the data contained irrelevant stimuli
that were presented after the participant had made their de-
cision. To eliminate these irrelevant stimuli, we estimated
the non-decision time for each participant based on their re-
sponses during the Easy games. Appendix A illustrates the
method in detail; the key points are summarised briefly be-
low.
For each participant, we reversed the sequence of stimuli
and aligned them on the response time. Let us call these
ordered sequence (si1, s
i
2, . . . , s
i
T ), where i is the trial num-
ber and (1, 2, . . . ,T ) are the stimulus indices before the re-
sponse. Each stimulus can be either ‘up’ or ‘down’, i.e.
sit ∈ {up,down}. At each time step, we estimated the cor-
relation (across trials) between the observing a stimulus in
a particular direction and making a decision to go in that
direction. That is, we computed pt at each stimulus index,
t ∈ {1, 2, . . . ,T }, as the fraction of trials where the response
ri ∈ {up, down} is the same as sit. So, for each participant, the
values (p1, p2, . . . , pT ) serve as an estimate of the correlation
between the stimulus at that index and the response.
If stimuli at a particular index, t, occurred after the deci-
sion, i.e. during the non-decision time, we expected them to
have a low correlation with response and consequently pt to
be below the drift rate, 0.70. We determined the first index in
the sequence with pt larger than 0.75; that is, the first index
with more than 75% of stimuli in the same direction as the
response. This gave us an estimate of the number of stimuli,
ND, that fall in the non-decision period. We used this esti-
mate to eliminate the stimuli, s1, . . . , sND from each recorded
sequence for the participant. See Figure A1 in Appendix A.
For twenty-one out of twenty-four participants, we esti-
mated ND = 1, that is, a non-decision delay of approxi-
mately 200ms. For two subjects the non-decision delay was
two stimuli and for one participant no stimuli were excluded.
Exclusion of participants. To ensure that each partic-
ipant understood the task, we conducted a binomial test on
responses in the Easy and Mixed-difficulty games. This test
checked whether the number of correct responses during a
game were significantly different from chance. Two partici-
pants failed this test during Mixed-difficulty games and were
excluded from further analysis.
Analysis method. We now describe how we estimated
the decision boundary underlying each participant’s deci-
sions. In signal-detection paradigms, the experimenter can-
not observe the exact sequence of samples based on which
the participant made their decision. Therefore, parameters
like boundary are obtained by fitting a sequential sampling
or accumulator model to the reaction time and error distri-
butions. In contrast, the expanded-judgement paradigm al-
lows us to observe the entire sequence of samples used to
make each decision. Therefore, our analysis method takes
into account not only the evidence and time at which the de-
cision (‘up’/‘down’) was made, but also the exact sequence
of actions (wait/go) in response to the sequence of cues seen
by the participant. It also takes into account the trial-to-trial
variability in the behaviour of participants: even when partic-
ipants saw the exact same sequence of cues, they could vary
their actions from one trial to next.
If a participant makes a decision as soon as evidence
crosses the boundary, the value of time and evidence, (t, x)
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during each decision should lie along this boundary. There-
fore, one way to recover this boundary is by simply fitting a
curve through the values of (t, x) for all decisions in a block.
However, note that participants show a trial-to-trial variabil-
ity in their decision-making. Sequential sampling models ac-
count for this trial-to-trial variability by assuming noisy inte-
gration of sensory signals as well as variability in either drift,
starting point or in threshold (see Ratcliff, 1978; Ratcliff &
Smith, 2004). We chose to model this variability by assum-
ing there is stochasticity in each wait/go decision. That is,
instead of waiting when evidence was below the boundary
and going as soon as evidence crossed the boundary, we as-
sumed that a participant’s decision depended on the outcome
of a random variable, with the probability of the outcome
depending on the accumulated evidence and time.
Specifically, we define two predictor variables – the evi-
dence accumulated, X = x, and the time spent in the trial,
T = t – and a binary response variable, A ∈ wait, go. The
probability of an action can be related to the predictor vari-
ables using the following logistic regression model:
log
P(A = go)
P(A = wait)
= β0 + βT ∗ T + βX ∗ X (2)
where βT and βX are the regression coefficients for time and
evidence, respectively, and β0 is the intercept. Given the
triplet (X,T, A) for each stimulus in each trial, we estimated
for each type of game and each participant the βˆ0, βˆT and βˆX
that maximised the likelihood of the observed triplets.
Figure 4 shows the results of applying the above analysis
to one participant. The data are split according to condition -
Easy, Difficult or Mixed. Each circle shows the end of a ran-
dom walk (sequence of stimuli) in the time-evidence plane.
These random walks were used to determine the (maximum
likelihood) regression coefficients, βˆ0, βˆX and βˆT , as outlined
above. These estimated coefficients are then used (Equa-
tion 2) to determine the probability of going at each x and
t, which is shown as the heat-map in Figure 4.
This heat-map shows that, under the Easy condition, this
participant’s probability of going strongly depended on the
evidence and weakly on the number of samples. In contrast,
under the Difficult condition, the participant’s probability of
going depends almost exclusively on the number of samples
– most of their decisions are made within a couple of samples
and irrespective of the evidence. Under the Mixed condition,
the probability of going is a function of both evidence and
number of samples.
Since we were interested in comparing the slopes of
boundaries during Easy and Mixed conditions, we deter-
mined a line of indifference under each condition, where
P(A = go) = P(A = wait), that is, the participant was
equally likely to choose actions wait and go. Substituting
in Equation 2 gives the line:
X = − βˆT
βˆX
∗ T − βˆ0
βˆX
(3)
with slope − βˆT
βˆX
and intercept as − βˆ0
βˆX
. We used the slope of
this line as an estimate for the slope of the boundary. Ap-
pendix B reports a set of simulations that tested the validity
of this assumption and found that there is a systematic rela-
tionship between this inferred slope and the true slope gener-
ating decisions. Importantly, these simulations also demon-
strate that even if the variability in data is due to noisy inte-
gration of sensory signals (rather than trial-to-trial variability
in decision boundary), this inferential method still allows us
to make valid comparisons of slopes of boundaries in Easy
and Mixed games.
Each panel in Figure 4 also shows the line of indifference
for the condition. The slope of the line of indifference is
steepest under the Difficult condition followed by the Mixed
condition and most flat for the Easy condition. Note that
for the Mixed condition, we only considered the “easy” tri-
als – that is, trials showing cues with correct probability =
0.70. This ensured that we made a like-for-like comparison
between Easy and Mixed conditions.
A quantitative comparison of slopes between conditions
can be made by taking the difference between slopes. How-
ever, a linear difference is inappropriate as large increas-
ing slopes are qualitatively quite similar to large decreas-
ing slopes – both indicate a temporal, rather than evidence-
based boundary (e.g. the Difficult condition in Figure 4).
Therefore, we compared slopes in the Mixed and Easy con-
ditions by converting these slopes from gradients to degrees
and finding the circular difference between slopes:
∆m = ((me − mm + 90) mod 180) − 90 (4)
where me and mm are the slopes in Easy and Mixed condi-
tions, respectively; ∆m is the difference in slopes and mod is
the modulo operation. Equation 4 ensures that the difference
between slopes is confined to the interval [−90,+90] degrees
and large increasing slopes have a small difference to large
decreasing slopes.
The above analysis assumes that evidence accumulated by
a participant mirrors the evidence presented by the experi-
menter – so there is no loss of evidence during accumulation
and the internal rate of evidence accumulation remains the
same from one trial to next. In Appendix C we performed
simulations to verify that inferences using the above analysis
remain valid even when there is loss in information accumu-
lated and when the drift rate varied from one trial to next.
Results
The mean reaction times during Easy, Difficult and Mixed
games were 1444ms (sem = 23ms), 1024ms (S EM = 47ms)
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Figure 4. The decisions made by a subject during Experiment 1 and the inferred boundaries based on these decisions. Each
scatter-plot shows the values of evidence and time where the subject made decisions during a particular game (only easy
trials considered during Mixed game). These values have been slightly jittered for visualisation. The heat-map shows the
P(Go|Xt = x) for each x and t inferred using logistic regression (see text). The solid line shows a “line of indifference” where
P(Go|Xt = x) = P(Wait|Xt = x) and serves as a proxy for the subject’s boundary (see Appendix B).
and 1412ms (S EM = 22ms), respectively, where S EM is
the within-subject standard error of the means. Note that
‘reaction time’ here refers to ‘decision time’, i.e. the raw
response time minus the estimated non-decision time. As
noted above, the non-decision time for most participants was
approximately 200ms. Figure 5 compares the slopes for the
lines of indifference in the Easy and Mixed games (black
circles). Error bars indicate the 0.95 percentile confidence
interval3. Like the participant shown in Figure 4 the esti-
mated slope for most participants was more negative during
the Mixed games than during Easy games, falling below the
identity line. A paired t-test on the difference in slopes in
the two conditions (using Equation 4) confirmed that there
was a significant difference in the slopes (t(21) = 5.24, p <
0.001,m = 15.94, d = 1.20), indicating that the type of game
modulated how participants set their decision boundary.
Figure 5 also shows the relationship between the slopes
of Easy and Mixed games for twenty-four simulated partic-
ipants (red crosses) who optimise the reward-rate. Each of
these participants had slopes of boundary calculated using
dynamic programming (Malhotra et al., under review) and
made decisions based on a noisy integration of evidence to
this optimal boundary. The slopes in each condition were
then inferred using the same procedure as for our real par-
ticipants. These optimal participants, like the majority of
participants in our study, had a larger (negative) slope in the
Mixed condition than the Easy condition. However, in con-
trast to the optimal participants, the majority of participants
also exhibited a negative slope during the Easy games, indi-
cating that they lowered their decision boundary with time
during this condition. A t-test confirmed that the slope dur-
ing easy condition was less than zero (t(21) = −5.51, p <
0.001,m = −11.47). Participants also showed substantial
variability in the decision boundary in the easy condition,
with slopes varying between 0 and 45 degrees.
An alternative possibility is that participants change their
decision boundary during the experiment, adopting a higher
(but constant) boundary towards the beginning and lowering
it to different (constant) boundary during the experiment. In
order to check for this possibility, we split the data from each
condition into two halves and checked whether the mean
number of samples required to make a decision changed from
the first half to second half of the experiment. During Easy
games, we found that participants observed 7.5 and 6.8 sam-
ples, on average, during the first and second half of the ex-
periment, respectively. During Mixed games, these mean
observations changed to 6.8 and 6.2 samples, on average,
during the first and second half of the experiment. A two-
sided paired t-test which examined whether the mean num-
ber of samples were different in the two halves of the ex-
periment found no significant difference in either the Easy
3Each confidence interval is based on percentiles of the boot-
strap distribution of the lines of indifference. Each bootstrap dis-
tribution is obtained by generating 1000 independent bootstrapped
data sets (per condition) and computing the slope for the line of
indifference on the data set. Each data set consists of N sampled
trials, where N is the number of trials (for that condition) seen by
the participant
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Figure 5. Each circle (black) compares the estimated slope
in Easy and Mixed games for one participant. Circles below
the dashed line were participants who had a larger gradient of
the inferred boundary during the Mixed games as compared
to the Easy games. Error bars indicate the 0.95 percentile
bootstrapped confidence intervals for the estimated slopes.
Crosses (red) show twenty-four simulated participants – de-
cisions were simulated using a rise-to-threshold model with
optimal boundaries shown in Figures 2d and 2f.
games (t(21) = 1.76, p = 0.09,m = 0.73) or in the Mixed
games (t(21) = 1.40, p = 0.18,m = 0.64).4
We checked the robustness of these results by performing
a model comparison exercise, pitting a time-varying decision
boundary against a fixed boundary model. The latter sim-
ply involves a logistic regression in which the decisions to
wait or go were based on evidence only. The full details of
this model comparison procedure and results are described in
Appendix D. Based on a comparison of Bayesian Informa-
tion Criteria (Schwarz, 1978; Wagenmakers, 2007), the time-
varying model provided a better account of the behaviour
of fifteen out of twenty-two participants in Mixed-difficulty
games. For three participants, the evidence was ambigu-
ous and for the remaining four participants the simpler, fixed
boundary model won. In Easy games, the model using time
as a predictor was better at accounting for data from thirteen
participants while the simpler model performed better to data
for eight participants.
In order to understand why participants decrease the deci-
sion boundary in Easy games and why different participants
show a large variation in their choice of boundary, we com-
puted the reward-rate accrued by each participant’s choice of
boundary and compared it to the reward-rate for the optimal
policy. This gave us the cost of setting any non-optimal deci-
sion boundary. Figure 6 shows the landscape (heat-map) of
the reward-rate for each type of game for a host of different
boundaries, defined by different combinations of intercepts
and slopes. The circles indicate the intercepts and slopes of
the inferred line of indifference of each participant.
Notice, in particular, the landscape for the Easy games.
Even though the peak of this landscape lies at the policy with
zero slope (flat bounds), there is a “ridge” of policies on the
landscape where the reward-rate is close to optimal. The
policies chosen by most participants in Experiment 1 seem
to lie along this ridge – even though participants do not nec-
essarily choose the optimal policy, they seem to be choosing
policies that are close to optimal. A similar pattern holds in
the Mixed games. In contrast, during Difficult games, the av-
erage reward is low, irrespective of the policy. Correspond-
ingly, there is a large variability in the policies chosen by
participants. We examine the effect of reward landscape on
the policies chosen by participants in more detail at the end
of Experiment 2.
Experiment 2
Experiment 1 established that people modulate their de-
cision boundary based on task difficulty and variations in
the reward landscape. However, our experimental paradigm
– effectively an expanded-judgement task – is clearly
very different from the dominant, typically signal-detection
paradigms used to test rise-to-threshold models and time-
varying boundaries (e.g., Britten, Shadlen, Newsome, &
Movshon, 1992; Palmer et al., 2005; Ludwig, 2009; Starns
& Ratcliff, 2012). In our paradigm, response times in Mixed
games were generally between 1-2s, whereas in the percep-
tual decision-making literature, reaction times are typically
between 0.5-1s (Palmer et al., 2005). It is possible that at this
speed participants do not, or cannot, modulate their decision
boundaries and instead adopt sub-optimal fixed thresholds.
Our aim in Experiment 2 then was to replicate and extend
our findings to a more rapid task, where reaction times were
similar to a signal-detection paradigm. More generally, we
tested the robustness and generality of the results from the
expanded-judgement task of Experiment 1 by introducing
different (i) stimulus materials, (ii) inter-stimulus intervals
and (iii) inter-trial intervals. The variation in inter-stimulus
interval was designed to induce more rapid decision-making
(with reaction times typically < 1s). Since the optimal poli-
cies are computed on a relative time scale (based on a unit
inter-stimulus interval), we can scale both the inter-stimulus
and inter-trial interval without affecting the optimal policy,
4Analogous analysis was also done for Experiments 2a-2d as
well and no significant differences were found.
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Figure 6. The reward-rates for different decision boundaries. In each panel, the slope and intercept determine a linear boundary.
The actions of all states below the boundary are set to wait and all states above are set to go. The heat-map in each panel
shows the reward-rate for each threshold. The circles show the inferred boundaries used by the participants in Experiment 1.
but reducing the reaction time. The variation in inter-trial
interval (specifically: for correct decisions, DC) was intro-
duced to manipulate the reward landscape, without affect-
ing the optimal policy. Bogacz et al. (2006) have previously
shown that the optimal policy is invariant to change in DC
for Single-difficulty games. Malhotra et al. (under review)
showed that this result generalises to the Mixed-difficulty
scenario: optimal policy for Mixed-difficulty games depends
only on the inter-trial interval for incorrect decisions, DI , but
is independent of the inter-trial interval for correct decisions,
DC , as long as DC < DI . If participants were optimising the
reward-rate, they should not change their decision boundary
with a change in DC . However, as we will see below, chang-
ing DC does affect the wider reward landscape around the
optimal policy and we explored to what extent participants
were sensitive to this change.
Parameter name Value
Drift for Easy condition (e) 0.22
Drift for Difficult condition (d) 0
Reward 2p
PPPPPPPISI
ITI DI = IS I ∗ 50
DC = 13 DI DC = DI
200msec Experiment 2a Experiment 2c
50msec Experiment 2b Experiment 2d
Table 2
Values of parameters for Experiment 2. The parameters that
are common to all four sub-experiments are listed at the top.
Each of the four sub-experiments has a different combination
of inter-stimuli and inter-trial intervals, the values of which
are listed at the bottom.
Permutations of varying these two parameters leads to
four experiments, which we have labeled Experiments 2a –
2d. The values of parameters for each experiment are shown
in Table 2. Experiment 2a was a replication of Experi-
ment 1 with exactly the same parameters, but using the new
paradigm (described below). In Experiment 2b, we scaled
the ISI and ITI to elicit rapid decisions but kept all other
parameters the same as Experiment 2a. In Experiment 2c,
we increased the inter-trial-interval for correct responses to
match that for incorrect responses. All other parameters were
kept same as Experiment 2a. Finally, in Experiment 2d, we
scaled ISI and ITI to elicit rapid decisions and also matched
inter-trial intervals for correct and incorrect decisions.
Like Experiment 1, twenty-four healthy adults between
the age of eighteen and thirty-five from the university com-
munity participated in each of these experiments, with no
overlapping participants between experiments.
Methods
Decreasing the inter-stimulus interval increases two
sources of noise in the experiment: (i) noise due to variation
in attention to cues (i.e. there is a greater likelihood of partic-
ipants “missing” samples when they are coming in faster) (ii)
noise due to visual interference between consecutive cues in
the same location. The second source of noise is particularly
challenging for our purposes. That is, the analysis presented
here assumes that each evidence sample is processed inde-
pendently. However, if we were to present a sequence of
cues in rapid succession, it is clear that, due to the temporal
response properties of the human visual system, successive
cues could “blend in” with each other (Georgeson, 1987).
As a result, we could not simply speed-up the presentation of
the arrow cues in the pacman task. We adapted the original
task from Experiment 1 to another evidence-foraging game
that retained the structure of the paradigm and that allowed
for systematic variation of the various parameters of interest
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(i.e. inter-stimulus and inter-trial intervals).
Participants were again asked to maximise their cumula-
tive reward by making correct decisions in a game. But now,
during each trial participants focused on a fixation cross in
the middle of the screen with gray background5 and were
told that a reward was either on the left or the right of the fix-
ation cross. In order to make their choice, participants were
shown cues that could appear either to the left or right of the
fixation cross. In order to minimise interference (see below)
cues could appear in two alternative locations on each side –
‘left-up’ or ‘left-down’ on the left and ‘right-up’ or ‘right-
down’ on the right. A cue appeared on the same side as
the reward with a given probability. Participants were given
this probability at the beginning of the game. For Single-
difficulty games, they were told that this probability was the
same ( 12 ±0.22) for all trials within this game. For the Mixed-
difficulty games, they were told that a particular trial during
the game could give cues with one of two different probabil-
ities ( 12 ± 0.22 or 12 ± 0) and they were given these possible
probabilities at the start of each game (i.e., block). Partici-
pants were again told that they could see as many cues as they
wanted during a trial before making a decision, but the total
duration of the game was fixed. Figure 7 shows an example
trial in which the participant makes the decision to go left
after observing a series of cues.
Each cue was a Gabor pattern (sinusoidal luminance grat-
ing modulated by a 2D Gaussian window). We designed
these cue patterns to minimise interference between consec-
utive patterns. The integration period of early visual mech-
anisms depends strongly on the spatiotemporal parameters
of the visual patterns. But for coarse (i.e. low spatial fre-
quency) and transient patterns it should be less than 100 ms
(Georgeson, 1987; Watson, Ahumada, & Farrell, 1986). To
ensure the low spatial frequency we fixed the nominal spatial
frequency of the Gabor to 0.4 cycles/deg (we did not pre-
cisely control the viewing distance, so the actual spatial fre-
quency varied somewhat between participants) and the size
of the Gaussian window to 1.2 deg (2D standard deviation).
The patterns had a vertical orientation. In the “fast” experi-
ments (Experiments 2b and 2d), each cue was displayed for
10ms and the delay between onset of two consecutive cues
(the inter-stimulus interval) was 50ms. To ensure that con-
secutive cues were processed independently by the visual
system we (i) alternated the location on one side of the screen
(e.g. ‘left-up’ and ‘left-down’) so that the smallest inter-
stimulus interval at any one retinal location was 90ms and
(ii) alternated the phase of the patterns (90◦ and 270◦).
Participants indicated their choice by pressing the left or
right arrow keys on a keyboard. When the decision was cor-
rect, a money bag appeared on the chosen side. During the
inter-trial interval, an animation displayed this money bag
moving towards the bottom of the screen. When the deci-
sion was incorrect, no money bag appeared. All money bags
Figure 7. An illustration of the paradigm for Experi-
ments 2a–2d. During each trial, participants chose left or
right based on a sequence of cues. Each cue was a Gabor
pattern displayed (for a fifth of ISI) in one of four possible
locations, equidistant from the fixation cross. If the decision
was correct (as in this example), a money bag was displayed
on the chosen side of the fixation cross and the participant
waited for the duration DC before starting the next trial. If
the decision was incorrect, no money bag was displayed and
the participant waited for the duration DI before starting the
next trial.
collected by the participant remained at the bottom of the
screen, so participants could track the amount of reward they
had gathered during the current game.
The structure of the experiment was the same as Experi-
ment 1, with the experiment consisting of a set of games of
fixed durations and given difficulties. Each game consisted
of a sequence of trials where participants could win a small
reward if they made the correct decision or no reward if they
made an incorrect decision. Games were again of three dif-
ferent types: (i) Type 1, corresponding to Easy games from
Experiment 1, (ii) Type 2 corresponding to Difficult games
and (iii) Type 3 corresponding to Mixed games. The type of
the game was indicated by the colour of the fixation cross –
Type 1: Green, Type 2: Red and Type 3: Blue. The order of
games was counterbalanced across participants.
In all four experiments the up-probability for Easy and
Difficult games was 0.50 ± 0.22 and 0.50 ± 0, respectively.
During Mixed games, Easy and Difficult trials were equally
likely. The reward-rate-optimal policy for Easy games was
again to maintain constant threshold (Figure 2d) while for
Difficult it was to guess immediately (Figure 2e). Similarly,
the optimal policy for the Mixed condition was to start with
5The luminance of the monitor was gamma-corrected so that lu-
minance was a linear function of grayscale RGB value. The back-
ground luminance was fixed to 0.5 on a scale of [0, 1].
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a high boundary (similar to the boundary at the start of Easy
games) and steadily decrease it, eventually making a deci-
sion at x = 0 (Figure 2f). Just like in Experiment 1, par-
ticipants were given training on each type of game and the
reward structure was divided into three components: £7 for
participating, 2p for each correct response and £20 for the
participant accumulating the largest number of money bags.
Results
We analysed data using the same method as Experiment 1
after removing the non-decision time. Wait and go actions
were used to determine the probability of going at all com-
binations of evidence and time, which were then used to de-
termine a line of indifference, where the probability of wait
matched the probability of go. We compared the slopes of
this line of indifference for Easy and Mixed games for each
of the four experiments.
Experiment 2a. This experiment used the same param-
eters as Experiment 1, but replaced the Pacman game, with
the evidence-foraging game described in Figure 7. Two par-
ticipants failed the binomial test in the Mixed games and
were excluded from analysis. The mean reaction times dur-
ing Easy, Difficult and Mixed games were 1155ms (5.8 sam-
ples, S EM = 17ms), 618ms (3.1 samples, S EM = 27ms)
and 1142ms (5.7 samples, S EM = 19ms), respectively. We
estimated the average number of stimuli that fell in the non-
decision period (ND) to be 0.96, i.e. a average non-decision
delay of approximately 192ms. For twenty-one out of the
twenty-two participants, we estimated ND = 1 and for one
participant no stimuli were excluded. Figure 8 (top-left
panel) shows a comparison of the estimated slopes of lines
of indifference in Easy and Mixed games. We observed that
slopes were negative in both Easy and Mixed games for al-
most all participants and more negative during Mixed games
than Easy games (t(21) = 3.92, p < 0.001,m = 15.76, d =
0.84). Again, circles show the slopes for estimated lines
of indifference for each subjects. The 0.95 percentile con-
fidence intervals on these slopes are obtained using the same
bootstrap procedure described in Experiment 1.6 Note that
the mean difference in slopes is virtually identical to Experi-
ment 1, although the effect size (Cohen’s d) was larger during
Experiment 1. Thus, Experiment 2a replicated the results of
Experiment 1 showing that the findings were robust to dif-
ferent formulations of the evidence-foraging game. A model
comparison exercise concurred with these results, showing
that the majority of participants in Mixed (N = 18) as well
as Easy games (N = 17) were better accounted by a logistic
regression model using both evidence and time as a predic-
tor than by a simpler model that used only evidence as the
predictor (see Appendix D for details).
Experiment 2b. In the next experiment, we decreased
the inter-stimulus interval to 50ms and scaled the inter-trial
intervals accordingly. All other parameters were the same as
Experiment 2a. All participants passed the binomial test in
the Easy and Mixed games. The mean reaction time during
Easy, Difficult and Mixed games were 337ms (6.7 samples,
S EM = 4.2ms) 418ms (8.4 samples, S EM = 9.8ms) and
419ms (8.4 samples, S EM = 5.3ms), respectively, showing
that this paradigm successfully elicited sub-second reaction
times typically found in signal detection paradigms. We es-
timated the average number of stimuli that fell in the non-
decision period to be 3.7, i.e., an average non-decision delay
of approximately 183ms. We estimated ND = 4 for fifteen
participants, ND = 3 for six participants, ND = 5 for two
participants and ND = 1 for one participant. The bottom-left
panel of Figure 8 shows the estimated slopes in Easy versus
Mixed games. Like Experiment 2a, the slopes were negative
for most participants in both Easy and Mixed games. Sim-
ilarly, we also observed that the slopes were more negative
in the Mixed games than in the Easy games, although the re-
sult was a little weaker than in Experiment 2a (t(23) = 2.12,
p = 0.044, m = 11.80, d = 0.47). There are three pos-
sible reasons for this weaker result. First, the distribution
for difference in slopes is more diffuse due the outlier at the
right of the plot. Excluding this participant gave a clearer
difference in slopes (t(22) = 3.31, p = 0.003, m = 15.19,
d = 0.72) that was numerically highly similar to the slope
difference observed in Experiments 1 and 2a. Second, for
reasons discussed below, our estimates of non-decision time
are likely to be less accurate in the “faster” paradigm. In
turn, this error introduces variability in the accuracy of the
actual evidence paths on a trial-by-trial basis that were used
to derive our slope estimates. Lastly, it is possible that the
process decreasing the boundary needs time to estimate the
drift and adjust the boundary accordingly. With shorter ISI,
this process may have less time to affect the decision process
before the response is made, resulting in smaller difference
in slopes between conditions.
Experiment 2c. Next, we changed the inter-stimulus in-
terval back to 200ms (same as Experiment 2a) but increased
DC , the inter-trial interval for correct decisions, to the same
value as DI , the inter-trial interval for incorrect decisions
(10s for both). Increasing the inter-trial interval decreased
the reward per unit time and meant that participants had to
wait longer between trials. Participants found this task dif-
ficult, we suspect because the inter-trial interval is so much
longer than the typical reaction time. That is, participants
spend most of their time waiting for a new trial, but then
those trials are over rather quickly. Perhaps as a result, the
games lacked in engagement and six out of twenty-four par-
ticipants failed the binomial test in Mixed games. For the
6When the estimated slope for a participant is really steep, a
large negative slope is qualitatively similar to a large positive slope.
For this reason the confidence intervals for some participants with
large slopes seem extremely wide. We compare the slopes using a
circular difference (Equation 4) which corrects for this problem.
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Figure 8. Slopes (in degrees) of estimated lines of indifference in Easy versus Mixed games in four experiments. The dashed
line shows the curve for equal slope in Easy and Mixed games. Each circle (black) shows the estimated slopes for one
participant. Error bars show 0.95 percentile bootstrapped confidence intervals. Crosses (red) show the estimated slopes for
twenty-four simulated participants – decisions were simulated using a rise-to-threshold model with boundaries given by the
optimal policy computed as described by Malhotra et al., under review.
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eighteen remaining participants, the mean reaction times in
Easy, Difficult and Mixed games were 807ms (4.0 samples,
S EM = 27ms), 858ms (4.3 samples, S EM = 49ms) and
954ms (4.8 samples, S EM = 32ms), respectively. We es-
timated the average number of stimuli that fell in the non-
decision period to be 0.9, i.e., an average non-decision delay
of approximately 176ms (ND = 2 for twenty-one participants
and ND = 0 for the remaining three participants). The esti-
mated slopes are shown in the top-right panel of Figure 8.
We observed much greater variability in the estimated de-
cision boundaries, though slopes were generally negative in
Mixed as well as Easy games.7 The mean estimated slopes
decreased more rapidly in Mixed games as compared to Easy
games. However, given the large variability of responses and
the number of participants that had to be excluded, this ef-
fect was comparatively weaker (t(17) = 2.41, p = 0.028,
m = 17.97, d = 0.60). Nevertheless, the mean slope dif-
ference is very similar to that observed in all previous three
experiments.
Experiment 2d. In this experiment we tested the final
permutation of inter-stimulus and inter-trial intervals – we
decreased the inter-stimulus interval to 50ms and matched
the inter-trial intervals for correct and incorrect decisions
(both 2.5s). Two participants failed the binomial test in
Mixed games and were excluded from further analysis. The
mean reaction times during Easy, Difficult and Mixed games
were 240ms (4.8 samples, S EM = 4ms), 308ms (6.2 sam-
ples, S EM = 9ms) and 294ms (5.9 samples, S EM = 5ms),
respectively. We estimated the average number of stimuli
that fell in the non-decision period to be 4.3, i.e., an aver-
age non-decision delay of approximately 216ms (ND = 4
for eighteen participants, ND = 5 for five participants and
ND = 7 for one participant). The bottom-right panel in
Figure 8 compares the estimated slopes in Easy and Mixed
games. The mean slope in either kind of game was negative
(t(21) = −3.10, p = 0.005, m = −11.66 for Easy games and
t(21) = −3.42, p = 0.003, m = −18.82 for Mixed games).
However, in contrast to Experiment 2b, there was no signif-
icant difference in mean estimated slopes during Easy and
Mixed games (t(21) = 1.71, p = 0.10,m = 7.15, d = 0.32).
Discussion
Experiments 2a-d revealed three key behavioural patterns:
(i) participants generally decreased their decision boundaries
with time, not only in the Mixed games, but also in the
Easy games, (ii) this pattern held for the rapid task (Experi-
ment 2b) but the variability of parameter estimates increased
at faster reaction times, (iii) decreasing the difference be-
tween DC and DI decreased the difference in slopes between
Easy and Mixed games.
Clearly, it is not optimal to decrease the decision boundary
during fixed difficulty (Easy) games, but most participants
seemed to do this. As noted in Experiment 1, a possible rea-
son is that the reward-rate for sub-optimal policies is asym-
metrical around the optimal boundary. Figure 9(a) shows the
reward-rate landscape for all possible decision boundaries
during Easy games in Experiment 2a, and maps the estimated
boundaries for each participant onto this landscape.
Reward-rate is maximum at (0, 3). When slope increases
above zero the reward-rate drops rapidly. In contrast, when
slope decreases below zero, reward-rate decreases gradually.
This asymmetry means that participants pay a large penalty
for a sub-optimal boundary with a positive slope, but a small
penalty for a sub-optimal boundary with a negative slope. If
participants are uncertain about the evidence gathered during
a trial, or about the optimal policy, it is rational for them to
decrease their decision boundary, as an error in estimation
will lead to a relatively small penalty. Figure 9 suggests that
most participants err on the side of caution and adopt poli-
cies with high (though not maximum) rewards and decreas-
ing boundaries.
The shape of the reward landscape also sheds light on why
participants behave differently when the inter-trial interval
DC is changed, even though changing this parameter does not
affect the optimal policy. The first column in Figure 9 shows
the reward-rate in experiments where DC = 13 DI , while the
second column shows the reward-rate in experiments where
DC = DI . The top two rows show the reward-rate landscapes
in Easy games at all combinations of slopes and intercepts,
while the bottom row compares the reward-rate in Easy and
Mixed games at a particular intercept of decision boundary
but different values of slope (i.e. a horizontal slice through
the heat-maps above). Even though the optimal policy in all
four experiments is the same, there are several ways in which
the reward-rate landscape in the left-hand column (Experi-
ments 2a and 2b) differ from the landscape in the right-hand
column (Experiments 2c and 2d).
Firstly, the reward-rate landscape in Easy games is more
sharply peaked when DC = 13 DI (Experiments 2a and 2b).
This is most clearly discernible in panels in the bottom row
which shows the profile of the (normalised) reward-rate land-
scape at a particular intercept. If the participant adopts a
boundary with large negative slope, the difference between
the reward-rate for such a policy and the optimal reward-rate
is larger when DC = 13 DI (left panel) than when DC = DI
(right panel). So in Experiments 2a and 2b adopting a sub-
optimal policy carries a larger ‘regret’ than in Experiments 2c
and 2d. This means that the reward landscape constrains the
choice of boundaries more in Experiments 2a and 2b than
it does in Experiments 2c and 2d, even though the optimal
7There is an outlier who seems to have a large positive slope
in Mixed games. This may seem unintuitive, but, as noted above,
there is little difference between a large positive and a large negative
slope – in both cases the probability of going depends strongly on
time (a temporal deadline) and weakly on evidence. The circular
difference (Equation 4) accounts for cases like this.
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Figure 9. Reward-rate for Experiments 2a–2d. Each heat-map in the first two rows shows the “landscape” of reward-rate in
policy space and dots show estimated policies adopted by participants in Easy games. The bottom row show profiles sliced
through the (normalised) reward-rate landscape at a particular intercept. Shaded regions show profiles for Easy games, while
hatched regions show profiles for Mixed games.
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policy for all experiments is the same.
The panels in the bottom row also compare the reward-rate
profiles during Easy (shaded) and Mixed (hatched) games at
a particular intercept. It can be seen that for both types of
experiments the normalised reward-rate is larger in Mixed
games than Easy games when slopes are more negative. Thus
it is better (more rewarding) to have decreasing boundaries in
Mixed games than in Easy games. However, the difference
in Easy and Mixed games is larger when DC = 13 DI (left
panel) than when DC = DI (right panel). Correspondingly,
we found a more robust difference in slopes during Experi-
ments 2a and 2b than we did in Experiments 2c and 2d.
The third behavioural pattern was an increase in variabil-
ity of slopes when the decisions were made more rapidly.
There are two possible sources of this variability: internal
noise and error in estimation of the non-decision time. Recall
that we excluded stimuli that arrive during the non-decision
time based on a single estimate of this time for each par-
ticipant. It is likely that the non-decision time varies from
trial-to-trial; indeed, this is a common assumption in models
of decision-making (see Ratcliff & Smith, 2004). Any such
variability means that on some trials we are including irrel-
evant samples (estimating a non-decision time too short) or
excluding relevant samples (estimating a non-decision time
too long). As a result, there is a discrepancy between the evi-
dence paths that actually led to the participant’s decision and
the one entered into the logistic regression model used to es-
timate the decision boundary. Importantly, this discrepancy
will be much smaller in the experiments with a long inter-
stimulus interval, because even an error in non-decision time
of, say, 100 ms will at most introduce only one additional or
excluded evidence sample. However, in the experiments with
a much shorter inter-stimulus intervals, the same numerical
error will result in several additional or missed evidence sam-
ples. Therefore, trial-to-trial variability in the non-decision
times introduces more noise in the slope estimates for the
faster experiments.
Experiment 3
In the above experiments, the optimal policy was to de-
crease decision boundaries in Mixed games but keep them
constant in Single-difficulty games. Correspondingly, data
suggested that participants adopted more strongly decreas-
ing boundaries in Mixed-difficulty games than in Single-
difficulty games, particularly when errors are costly (in terms
of reward-rate). In Experiment 3 we changed the parameters
so that the optimal policy during Mixed-difficulty games was,
in fact, to increase the decision boundary. Recall from the
theory on optimal shapes of decision boundaries that the op-
timal policy in Mixed games is to decrease decision bound-
aries only when one of the decision types is extremely dif-
ficult. In contrast, when both types of decisions are easy or
moderately difficult, the policy that optimises reward-rate is
Parameter name Value
Drift for Easy condition (e) 0.40
Drift for Difficult condition (d) 0.10
Reward 2p
Inter-trial interval, correct 3.5 sec
Inter-trial interval, incorrect 3.5 sec
Inter-stimuli interval 50 msec
Table 3
Values of parameters used during Experiment 3.
to increase decision boundaries or leave them constant (Fig-
ure 2c). Therefore, if participants were optimising their aver-
age reward, we expected estimated slopes in Mixed-difficulty
games of this type to be either the same or larger than slopes
in Single-difficulty games.
Experiment 3 used the same experimental paradigm as
Experiment 2. The parameters for Experiment 3 are shown
in Table 3. During this experiment, Easy games showed
cues with up-probability 12 ± 0.40 – so participants could
make really rapid decisions in these games. And unlike Ex-
periments 1 and 2, Difficult games showed cues with up-
probability 12 ± 0.10. The optimal boundaries in this case
are higher for Difficult games than Easy games (Figures 2a
and 2b) and the optimal boundary for Mixed games show a
slight increase in evidence with time (Figure 2c).
Twenty four participants played blocks of Easy, Difficult
and Mixed games with the objective of maximising their re-
ward. Each correct decision was worth 2p and there was no
reward or penalty for incorrect decisions. The participant
who collected the largest number of money bags received
a bonus reward of £20. The inter-stimulus interval was 50
msec and inter-trial interval was 3.5 sec.
We used the same procedure as the above experiments to
analyse the data. All participants passed the binomial test in
Mixed games so no data was rejected. Figure 10 shows the
estimated slopes for lines of indifference in Easy, Difficult
and Mixed games. Unlike the previous experiments, we com-
pared the slopes in Mixed games not only to Easy games, but
also to Difficult games, since the Difficult games in this case
required participants to accumulate evidence before making
a decision.
During Easy games, participants made really rapid
(and accurate) decisions, with mean reaction times 107ms
(S EM = 4ms), that is, based on two to three sample cues
(after excluding non-decision time). Such fast responses are
of course consistent with the model prediction of narrow
decision boundaries in this condition. As discussed above,
on this rapid time scale noise in the responses due to non-
decision time or due to variability of the perceptual system
has a large impact on the variability of estimated slopes. In-
deed, we can see from Figure 10 (left panel), that the confi-
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Figure 10. Slopes of estimated lines of indifference in Ex-
periment 3. The panel on the left compares slopes for the
Easy trial during Mixed games with slopes for all trials dur-
ing Easy games while the panel on the right compares slopes
for the Difficult trials in Mixed games with slopes for all tri-
als during Difficult games. In each panel, the solid vertical
and horizontal lines show lines of zero slope (flat threshold)
and the dashed line shows the curve for equal slopes in the
two types of games. Each circle shows the estimated slopes
for one participant and crosses show estimated slopes from
simulated optimal participants.
dence intervals around estimated slopes are large and there
was substantial (between-participant) variability in the mean
estimated slopes.
A more accurate comparison between Single and Mixed-
difficulty games is obtained by comparing the slopes in Diffi-
cult games with the slopes on Difficult trials in Mixed games.
The panel on the right in Figure 10 shows this comparison.
The mean reaction times in Difficult games was 397ms (8
samples, S EM = 9ms), while that in the Mixed games was
234ms (4.7 samples, S EM = 6ms). We estimated the non-
decision time to be approximately 4.5 samples, i.e., 227ms
(ND = 5 for thirteen participants and ND = 4 for the re-
maining eleven participants). Like previous experiments, the
mean slope in Single-difficulty (here, Difficult) games was
less than zero (t(23) = −3.15, p < 0.001,m = −19.5).
Crucially, in contrast to Experiment 1 and 2, but in agree-
ment with the reward-rate optimising policy, we found that
the estimated slopes in Mixed games were slightly larger
(less negative) than in the Difficult games (t(23) = −2.25,
p = 0.034, m = −9.86, d = −0.39). Indeed, model compari-
son suggested that, again in contrast to Experiment 1 and 2,
the simpler logistic regression model using only evidence
as the predictor provided a better account of data in Mixed
games than the model using both evidence and time as pre-
dictors (see Appendix D). However, for the Difficult games,
the evidence was more mixed in that for just over half the
participants, a model that included time as a predictor per-
formed better. These results are consistent with the slope
comparisons in that boundaries varied with time (slightly)
in Difficult games, but were approximately constant in the
Mixed games. Although we do not actually observe increas-
ing boundaries, the shift from decreasing to approximately
constant boundaries is a shift in the right direction.
In Figure 11, we have again plotted the estimated poli-
cies of all participants on the reward landscape. The key
difference in behaviour between Mixed and Difficult games
was that most participants were concentrated around the zero
slope during Mixed games while the slope of boundaries cho-
sen by participants in the Difficult games were spread over a
large range with a number of participants choosing policies
with large negative slopes. In the right-most panel, we have
compared the profile of the landscape, slicing it at intercept
= 3 (optimal policy in Mixed games had slope slightly above
0 and intercept between 3 and 4). This profile shows that,
like Experiment 2, reward-rate is an asymmetric function of
slope in both the Difficult and Mixed games. However, in
contrast to Experiment 2, the amount of asymmetry is now
lesser during Mixed games than Difficult games. So during
Mixed games, participants can choose policies in the neigh-
bourhood of constant boundary with a lower regret, even in
the presence of uncertainty about the evidence or the optimal
boundary. This could explain why the majority of partici-
pants in the Mixed games are concentrated around policies
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Figure 11. Reward-rate during Difficult and Mixed games
during Experiment 3. Each heat-map shows the “landscape”
of reward per unit time in policy space. Lighter colours show
higher reward. Each circle shows the slope and intercept of
the estimated line of indifference for a participant. The right-
most panel compares the reward landscape in Difficult and
Mixed games at a particular intercept.
with zero slope. In contrast, the larger asymmetry during
Difficult games seems to push a number of participants into
adopting boundaries with large negative slopes – a lower risk
strategy that nevertheless leads to a small loss in average re-
ward.
General Discussion
Constant or Decreasing boundaries
Sequential sampling models have had a very successful
history of fitting data in a variety of decision-making ex-
periments (Ratcliff, 1978; Smith & Vickers, 1989; Ratcliff
& Smith, 2004; Bogacz et al., 2006; Ratcliff et al., 2016).
These models typically assume that decision boundaries re-
main constant during a trial, so introducing the possibility of
changing boundaries adds further complexity to these mod-
els. The question is whether this complexity is warranted
given existing data.
Recently, Hawkins et al. (2015) and Voskuilen, Ratcliff,
and Smith (2016) conducted a model comparison based on
data from a number of decision-making studies and found
that introducing decreasing bounds did not generally im-
prove the model fit. In this study, we took a different ap-
proach – instead of working out whether decreasing bound-
aries improves model fit, we used a mathematical model
(Malhotra et al., under review) to establish the circumstances
for changing decision boundary if the decision-maker wanted
to maximise reward-rate. The key insight from this approach
is that optimal decision boundaries decrease only in very
specific scenarios – when one of the difficulty in a Mixed-
difficulty task is extremely difficult, or even impossible. In
other conditions, optimal boundaries for Mixed-difficulty
tasks may increase or stay constant based on the difficulty of
constituent decisions. An advantage of the model presented
in this study is that it can be used for inferring the reward-
rate of any given boundary, which can then be used to com-
pare with the optimal boundary. Using this approach, we
found that sub-optimal policies were “asymmetrically dis-
tributed” near the optimal boundary in policy space. A ju-
dicious decision-maker should consider this asymmetry in
reward landscape to make decisions that are robust to un-
certainty in task parameters and to their own estimate of the
optimal policy. Six expanded-judgement experiments indi-
cate that people may not only be modulating how decision
boundaries change with time, but may also be using such
robustness considerations to choose the value and shape of
these boundaries.
So why do Hawkins et al. (2015) and Voskuilen et al.
(2016) find no strong evidence for changing decision bound-
aries and, indeed, why are models with constant decision
thresholds so successful at fitting data from a variety of ex-
periments? There could be three possible reasons. Firstly,
the datasets analysed by Hawkins et al. (2015) and Voskuilen
et al. (2016) consist of Mixed-difficulty experiments with a
variety of different difficulty levels. For example, Experi-
ment 1 conducted by Hawkins et al. (2015) was a motion-
discrimination task with six different difficulty levels (0%,
2.5%, 5%, 10%, 20% and 40%) while Experiment 1 from
Ratcliff, Hasegawa, Hasegawa, Smith, and Segraves (2007)
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was a brightness-discrimination task with three levels of dif-
ficulty (55%, 65% and 98%). It is not clear in any of these ex-
periments what the shape of boundaries that optimise reward-
rate should be. As we have discussed above, optimal bound-
aries do not necessarily decrease in Mixed-difficulty trials
and when they do decrease, the rate of decrease varies over a
broad range based on the levels of difficulty. So even if par-
ticipants were optimising reward-rate in the experiments con-
sidered by Hawkins et al. (2015) and Voskuilen et al. (2016),
this may not necessarily entail observing decreasing bound-
aries.
Secondly, each of our experiments carefully controls the
cost / reward of each decision and links performance to re-
ward. This allows us to compute the optimal behaviour
in the task (in terms of reward-rate) and compare partici-
pant performance with this optimal behaviour. In contrast,
most studies considered by Hawkins et al. do not have a
performance-based reward structure. Participants are asked
to emphasise speed, accuracy or both and there is no explicit
scale on which a participant can measure the expected re-
turn of a policy. Exceptions to these are studies involving
non-human primates, such as Roitman and Shadlen (2002),
Ratcliff, Cherian, and Segraves (2003) and Ditterich (2006),
where performance was explicitly linked to reward and inter-
estingly, Hawkins et al. find evidence for decreasing bound-
aries in these studies.
Decisions in ecologically realistic situations are typically
accompanied by costs and rewards and the structure of incen-
tives can profoundly affect performance, as shown by a se-
ries of studies in experimental economics (Camerer & Hog-
arth, 1999; Cubitt, Starmer, & Sugden, 1998). Therefore, if
we want to establish whether participants decrease decision
boundaries within a trial, we must determine what it is they
stand to gain by changing their decision boundaries during
the experiment.
Lastly, note that the expanded-judgement paradigm used
by us is different from the signal detection paradigms used
in studies analysed by Hawkins et al. (2015) and Voskuilen
et al. (2016). This is a key strength of our study as we are
able to observe the exact sequence of stimuli observed by
the decision-maker and infer their decision boundaries based
on these observations. It has been demonstrated recently
that constraining sequential sampling models by the exact
sequence of stimuli provides a closer description of reaction
times than that obtained from models in which the drift pa-
rameter is assumed constant within a trial (Park, Lueckmann,
Kriegstein, Bitzer, & Kiebel, 2016). However, using this
paradigm leaves open the possibility that the decision bound-
ary is set differently when the decision processes draw sam-
ples from an internal representation (e.g. in colour / bright-
ness / numerosity judgement tasks) and when samples drawn
cannot be recorded by the experimenter. Previous evidence
suggests that results from expanded-judgement tasks can be
generalised to situations where sampling is internal (Vickers,
Burt, et al., 1985; Vickers, Smith, Burt, & Brown, 1985).
However, these studies did not examine a signal-detection
task where reaction times are typically < 500ms. Thus, an
important outstanding question is whether people use differ-
ent decision processes for internally and externally sampled
observations and whether this affects how they set their deci-
sion boundaries.
Data from several expanded-judgement tasks involving
choice between multiple alternatives have been success-
fully analysed using sequential sampling models with fixed
boundaries, which have been shown to capture the key in-
teresting aspects of these data (Brown, Steyvers, & Wagen-
makers, 2009; Hawkins, Brown, Steyvers, & Wagenmakers,
2012, 2012). It would be interesting to extend the model fit-
ting methodology presented in this paper to the case of choice
between multiple alternatives, and investigate if these data
are be better described by a model with flat or decreasing
boundaries.
Individual differences
In all of the above experiments, we observed variability in
behaviour both between individuals and between trials within
a participant. We have already discussed two reasons for
the variability between trials: (i) non-decision time, which
is estimated per individual but may vary from trial-to-trial
and (ii) internal noise, which could lead to a trial-to-trial
variability in drift rate. As mentioned above, a trial-to-trial
variability in drift rate, starting point or threshold has been
shown to be essential for fitting reaction time distributions –
in particular, different patterns of error reaction times – us-
ing sequential sampling models (see Ratcliff, 1978; Ratcliff
& Smith, 2004). In addition to these, our study highlights
another source of variability between individuals – the shape
of the reward landscape with its broad region in which “ac-
ceptably” high reward-rates could be achieved. Reward rate
was asymmetrically distributed around the optimal policy in
all the above experiments, with a bias towards sub-optimal
policies that yielded a reward-rate that was close to maxi-
mum.
A number of previous studies have compared individuals
to optimal behaviour in decision-making tasks and found that
participants often use boundaries that are sub-optimal (Pitz et
al., 1969; Sanders & Linden, 1967; Wallsten, 1968; Simen et
al., 2009; Starns & Ratcliff, 2010; Bogacz, Hu, et al., 2010;
Zacksenhouse, Bogacz, & Holmes, 2010). It has also been
observed that participants have a tendency to overvalue accu-
racy, setting boundaries that are wider than those suggested
by maximisation of reward-rate (Maddox & Bohil, 1998; Bo-
hil & Maddox, 2003; Myung & Busemeyer, 1989; Balci et
al., 2011; Starns & Ratcliff, 2012). To explain this behaviour,
a set of studies have investigated alternative objective func-
tions (Bohil & Maddox, 2003; Bogacz et al., 2006; Zacksen-
OVERCOMING INDECISION 23
house et al., 2010). For example, Zacksenhouse et al. (2010)
found that only about 30% of participants achieve (reward-
rate) optimality and the behaviour of the other 70% is better
explained by a robust strategy that maximises performance
under presumed level of uncertainty (the maximin strategy).
The behaviour of participants in our experiments is in line
with such a robust strategy: a small proportion of participants
adopt policies that are close to optimal (Figures 5, 8, and 10)
but most participants adopt strategies that yield high, but not
maximum, reward-rate (Figures 6, 9 and 11). Since the gra-
dient of reward-rate was larger above constant boundary than
below, this meant choosing a policy with a decreasing bound-
ary.
In the above experiments there can be several sources of
uncertainty, leading to adoption of a robust strategy: uncer-
tainty in estimation of task parameters such as ISI/ITI, un-
certainty in the signal due to noise in the sensory system and
uncertainty in the estimate of reward-rate for the task. If par-
ticipants use a hill-climbing learning mechanism (Myung &
Busemeyer, 1989; Simen, Cohen, & Holmes, 2006), these
uncertainties will introduce noise in the learning process and
make it harder for participants to search for the optimal pol-
icy, especially when the reward landscape has a low gra-
dient, leading to the observed differences in the choice of
boundaries. With training, participants should be able to re-
duce these uncertainties and approach optimal boundaries,
as shown by previous research (Myung & Busemeyer, 1989;
Balci et al., 2011).
Conversely, when internal noise in the sensory system
increases or when the estimate of the task parameters be-
comes more uncertain, participants should find it more dif-
ficult to locate the optimal policy in policy space. For ex-
ample, it has been shown that the duration estimates of older
adults are more variable than younger adults (Block, Zakay,
& Hancock, 1998) and visual perception declines with aging
(Weale, 1963; Spear, 1993; Habak & Faubert, 2000; Owsley,
2011). These processes will increase the level of uncertainty
in the (temporal) task parameters as well as the visual stim-
uli and could explain why older adults adopt boundaries that
are farther from optimal (Starns & Ratcliff, 2010, 2012). Of
course, it is also possible that the deviation from optimality
is a consequence of not only an increase in visual and tem-
poral noise but also a decline in the ability to flexibly set the
boundary and more empirical studies would be required to
tease apart the relative contribution of these two factors.
Mechanistic considerations
The behaviour of participants in the experiments above
suggests that they adapt their decision-making mechanism to
achieve near-maximal reward-rates. We do not claim partici-
pants are optimal – they are clearly not. Nor do we claim that
the mathematical model we have used to derive the optimal
policy is a psychological theory. The focus of our study was
not on establishing the mechanism by which people achieve
this behaviour but on comparing the normative behaviour
with the empirical behaviour. In a manner similar to “ideal
observer models” in the study of sensory systems (Geisler,
2003), specifying the optimal policy has helped us (i) iden-
tify experimental conditions that are best suited to empiri-
cally test time-varying decision boundaries, and (ii) identify
sources for sub-optimal behaviour (or inefficiencies) through
analysis of the reward landscape. Nevertheless, we finish
with some considerations of the underlying mechanisms that
may be responsible for the time varying boundaries observed
in our study.
First of all, the reader may wonder whether the decreas-
ing bounds we identify in our experiments may be accounted
for by existing mechanisms in models that assume constant
boundaries. In Appendix C we explore two such mechanisms
– between-trial noise in the drift rate and imperfect integra-
tion of information. We simulated decisions using a rise-to-
threshold model both with and without between-trial noise
in drift rate and with and without loss in integration of ev-
idence. We then estimated the slopes of boundaries using
the method discussed above and found that the estimated dif-
ference in slopes between Single and Mixed-difficulty con-
ditions reflected the true difference, irrespective of the noise
in drift rate or loss in integration of evidence. Thus, our in-
ferences about difference in slopes remain valid even when
these mechanisms are considered.
Next, the pattern of decision-making we observed in the
expanded-judgement tasks is compatible with a number of
different mechanistic accounts. For example, it is possible
that participants did not weigh each cue equally and cues
later in the decision carried a larger weight. This mech-
anism has been recently suggested by the urgency-gating
model (Cisek, Puskas, & El-Murr, 2009; Thura, Beauregard-
Racine, Fradet, & Cisek, 2012). Similarly, it is also possible
that participants maintained a constant threshold but also em-
ployed a stochastic deadline. That is, they maintain an inter-
nal clock and make a decision if evidence crosses a constant
threshold before a deadline or choose the most-likely alterna-
tive if the threshold is not crossed but a deadline is reached.
This mechanism is similar to the response signal paradigm
(e.g., Ratcliff, 2006), with an internal instead of an exter-
nal deadline. Both these mechanisms will lead to decision
boundaries that appear to decrease with time. However, the
urgency gating model does not assume integration of sensory
input over whole duration of trial, but rather rapid forgetting
of previously integrated input. It would be interesting to for-
mally compare in a future study whether the urgency gating
model or an integration to boundary model better describes
data from the current study, which is freely available, as men-
tioned above.
However, note that the normative model does not al-
ways predict that decision boundaries should decrease with
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time. In agreement with this, we found that many partici-
pants in Experiment 3 did not appear to decrease their deci-
sion boundaries in Mixed-difficulty condition (also see Fig-
ure D1). These findings are not straightforward to reconcile
in mechanistic accounts such as urgency-gating and stochas-
tic deadline and provide a good test for teasing apart these
models.
The logistic regression model used to infer the boundary
from data (Equations 2 and 3) assumes that people integrate
evidence to a constant boundary but that the slope of the
boundary is allowed to vary. Under this assumption, par-
ticipants appear to decrease their decision boundaries when
decreasing boundaries increases reward-rate. So the thrust of
our argument is that people seem sensitive to the normative
behaviour and when the normative behaviour changes (Sin-
gle vs Mixed-difficulty conditions) participants seem to adapt
their decision mechanism in line with the normative standard.
A separate and important question is how people make this
adaptation. Decreasing the decision boundary, increasing the
gain of observations or maintaining a stochastic deadline are
all possible mechanisms to achieve this goal and future re-
search should examine what mechanisms are employed by
people.
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Appendix A
Non-decision time
Figure A1 illustrates the reverse correlation procedure used
to compute non-decision time across the experiments. For
this example participant, the proportion of Easy-difficulty tri-
als where the samples at time steps (1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, . . .) be-
fore the response were in the same direction as the responses
were (0.62, 0.65, 0.63, 0.68, 0.85, 0.91, . . .). The first time-
step where this proportion was larger than 0.75 was 5 and
we estimated the non-decision time to be 4. Note that the
correlation during the non-decision time is not 0.50 due to
drift in the stimuli – the responses made by participants are
generally correlated to the stimulus (provided their response
rates were better than chance, which we check for in our ex-
clusion criterion). Hence it is important to pick a threshold
that is larger than the drift. We experimented with a num-
ber of different threshold values. Results remained similar
for a range of threshold values that were above the drift rate
but below the highest correlated stimuli for the participant.
The threshold value chosen in this manner was kept constant
across participants and experiments.
Note that this analysis method assumes a fixed non-
decision time across trials. Since non-decision time would,
presumably, vary from trial to trial, we carried out simula-
tions to test how trial-by-trial variability in non-decision time
affects our estimates of the slopes of the decision bound-
aries. We found that the analysis method outlined in the
main text was robust under trial-to-trial variability in non-
decision time: adding a trial-by-trial variability added a small
amount of noise in our estimates but estimated slopes were
still highly correlated with true slopes and inferences about
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Figure A1. The plot shows the proportion of trials at each
time step before the response (for a particular participant and
condition) that are in the same direction as the response. The
dashed horizontal line represents a threshold on this propor-
tion used to compute the non-decision time. The dashed ver-
tical line shows the last time-step where this proportion was
below the threshold.
difference in slopes between conditions remained the same
irrespective of the variability of non-decision time.
Appendix B
Parameter recovery
In this study, we estimated decision boundaries based on
a line of indifference computed using a logistic regression
model. We now show that this estimation method allows
us to make valid comparisons about slopes of Single and
Mixed-difficulty games and that our inferences about differ-
ence in slopes are valid irrespective of whether the noise in
decisions originates from stochasticity in wait/go actions (as
we assume) or from a noisy integration of sensory signals.
We evaluated estimated slopes by simulating deci-
sions from known boundaries and comparing estimated val-
ues with known values. Decisions were simulated using two
alternative models: (i) a rise-to-threshold model, with noisy
accumulation of evidence but no noise in the boundary and
(ii) a rise-to-threshold model with no noise in the accumu-
lated signal but noisy wait-go decisions. Once decisions had
been generated, slopes were estimated using two alternative
fitting methods: the logistic regression method described in
Equations 2 and 3 and a maximum likelihood fit to rise-to-
threshold model described below. Below (Figure B1) we
show a 2x2 comparison between the two estimation methods
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and the two models used to generate the decisions. Before
discussing these results, we describe how simulated data was
generated and how the slopes of boundary were estimated.
Simulating decisions
In the noisy accumulation model, each sample (cue)
was generated using a Bernoulli process (Equation 1), with
drift parameters, ue = 0.72, ud = 0.50. These samples were
then integrated in a noisy decision-variable, V:
Vt+1 = Vt + δX + ξ (5)
where ξ ∼ N(·|0, σ2V ) is a zero-mean Gaussian noise with
variance σ2V . This integration process generates a random
walk, (X1, . . . , Xt) and terminates when the decision-variable,
Vt, crosses a known boundary. We simulated random walks
using 200 different values of boundary (standing for 200 sim-
ulated participants), with varying slopes and intercepts, gen-
erating 1000 random walks for each boundary (in both Easy
and Mixed conditions).
For the stochastic boundary model, decisions were
generated stochastically based on the distance from bound-
ary. For each given boundary, θ, we determined the probabil-
ity of going at any point (t, x) of the random walk, based on
the distance, fθ(t, x), of the point from the boundary:
P(A = go) =
e fθ(t,x)
1 + e fθ(t,x)
(6)
The key difference between data simulated using this model
and the rise-to-threshold model is that this model does not
assume any accumulation of noise – each wait / go action is
independent and solely based on P(A = go) at that point.
Estimating slopes
The logistic regression method of estimating slopes
has been described in the main text (Equations 2 and 3). We
now describe how we generated maximum-likelihood esti-
mates of slopes for the rise-to-threshold model with noisy
accumulation of evidence.
According to this model, the value of the decision
variable after accumulating t samples and evidence x is ob-
tained by integrating Equation 5 and is given by the Gaus-
sian distribution, N(·|x, σ2dt), with mean x and variance σ2dt,
where σd is a free parameter that needs to be estimated. The
probability of observing a go at (t, x) will be given by the
probability that the decision variable is greater than or equal
to the boundary, θ, i.e.
P(tgo, xgo) =
∫ ∞
θ(t,x)
N(κ|x, σ2dt) dκ
= 1 − Φ( fθ(t, x)|x, σ2dt)
(7)
where fθ(t, x) is the distance to the current evidence, x, from
the boundary and Φ(·|x, σ2dt) is the cumulative Gaussian with
mean x and variance σ2dt. The boundary θ is parameterised
by it’s slope, m, and intercept, c. Both of these are free pa-
rameters of the model. Similarly, the probability of waiting
at (t, x) is given by Φ( fθ(t,x)|x, σ2dt). If Dwait is the set of all
wait observations, {(twait1 , xwait1 ), . . . , (twaitn , xwaitn )}, and Dgo is
the set of all go observations, {(tgo1 , xgo1 ), . . . , (tgom , xgom )}, then
the likelihood of all observations is given by:
L(D|m, c, σd) =
∏
(t,x)∈Dgo
(1 − Φ( fθ(t, x)|x, σ2dt))
∏
(t,x)∈Dwait
Φ( fθ(t, x)|x, σ2dt)
(8)
whereD includes bothDwait andDgo decisions. We obtained
estimates, mˆ, cˆ and σˆd that maximised the likelihood function
given in Equation 8.8
Evaluation of estimation methods
The panel on the top-left of Figure B1 compares the
true and estimated difference in slopes when decisions were
generated using the noisy accumulation model (Equation 5)
and estimated using the logistic regression model (Equa-
tions 2 and 3). The estimated difference in slopes is not
equal to the true difference and the deviation from truth does
depend on the noise in the accumulation process, σV ; sim-
ulations showed that the difference approaches zero as σV
approaches zero. Moreover, the estimated difference is ap-
proximately proportional to the true difference, so that if sta-
tistical test, such as the t-test, is valid on the true difference it
will also be valid on the estimated difference.
The top-right panel in Figure B1 compares the true
and estimated differences in slopes, when decision were
again generated using the noisy accumulation model (Equa-
tion 5) and also estimated assuming a noisy accumulation to
boundary (Equation 8). It can be seen that the difference in
slopes estimated using this method is fairly similar to that
estimated using the logistic regression model. The estimated
difference is approximately proportional to the true differ-
ence and, like the estimates in top-left panel, these estimates
also contains a deviation that depends on the diffusion param-
eter used to generate the data, σV . Simulations also showed
(not shown in Figure B1) that, while the difference in slopes
using this method was similar to that using the logistic re-
gression method, this method overestimated the slopes when
true slope was zero – that is, when bounds are in fact flat, it
estimates them to be increasing, which is not the case with
the logistic regression method used in this study.
8Note that we used both Dwait and Dgo to obtain maximum-
likelihood estimates. If we use onlyDgo, which is what is available
if the paradigm does not involve an expanded-judgement task, we
get a more noisy estimate of the slope. In that case we also obtain a
poor correlation between true and estimated differences when data
was simulated using the stochastic boundary model (bottom-right)
graph.
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Figure B1. True versus estimated difference in slopes for 200 simulations. Each circle represents one participant simulated
using either a rise-to-threshold model (first row) or a probabilistic boundary model (second row). The figures in the left column
compare true difference with the difference estimated using logistic regression (as described in Section ‘Experiment 1’) while
the panels in the right column make the same comparison but slopes are estimated by fitting a rise-to-threshold model.
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The bottom-left panel shows that the difference in
slopes estimated using the logistic regression model (Equa-
tions 2 and 3) are highly correlated with the true differences
when data is simulated using the stochastic boundary model
(Equation 6). This is not surprising since this method of gen-
erating the data inverts the logistic regression model. In con-
trast, the bottom-right panel shows that when slopes are es-
timated using the noisy accumulation process (Equation 8),
the correlation between the true and estimated difference in
slopes decreases and there is a bias in the estimated differ-
ence albeit, again, multiplicative.
To sum up, difference in slopes estimated using the
logistic regression model, were at least as good as estimates
using the maximum likelihood method and the logistic re-
gression model was, in fact, robust to mis-specification of the
model that generates the data. Furthermore, estimated differ-
ences were linearly related to true differences, which meant
that it was valid to use the t-test on the estimated differences
for inferring whether there was a difference in the true slopes
of Single and Mixed-difficulty games.
Appendix C
Variable drift rate and Information loss
We have analysed the data based on the evidence and time
of each wait and go decision, assuming that participants ac-
cumulated every cue provided to them and the internal drift
rate was the same in every trial. In this Appendix we verified
whether our inferences about difference in slopes would be
valid if some evidence was lost during accumulation and the
drift rate varied from trial-to-trial.
Consider a variable drift rate first. Even though our
experiments use the expanded-judgement paradigm where
the drift of the stimulus is controlled by the experimenter,
it is possible that the internal drift rate varies from trial-to-
trial due to fluctuations in attention and cognitive resources.
Fluctuations in the effect of stimulation have been modelled
as a random variable since Thurstone’s comparative and cat-
egorical judgement models (Thurstone, 1927a, 1927b) and
form an integral part of signal detection theory (Tanner &
Swets, 1954; Green & Swets, 1966) and sequential sampling
models (Ratcliff, 1978; Ratcliff & Smith, 2004).
In order to check how variability in drift rate affected
our results, we simulated decisions using a rise-to-threshold
model both with and without variability in drift and estimated
the slopes in each case using the logistic regression method
(Equation 3). A comparison between the estimated slopes
showed us how a variability in drift affects our estimate.
Decisions were simulated using the following
method. Stimuli were generated using a Bernoulli process
(Equation 1), with drift  = 0 + ν, where 0 was a constant
drift parameter based on the type of game (e.g., 0 = 0.22
for Easy games) and ν ∼ N(0, σ2dri f t) was a random variable
drawn independently for every trial. The overall drift, , was
bound between 0 and 12 . This stimuli was then integrated in
a noisy decision-variable, V:
Vt+1 = Vt + δX + ξ (9)
where ξ ∼ N(0, σ2V ) is a zero-mean Gaussian noise with vari-
ance σ2V . This integration process generated a random walk,
(X1, . . . , Xt) and terminated when the decision-variable, Vt,
crossed a known boundary. We simulated random walks us-
ing 200 different values of boundary (standing for 200 sim-
ulated participants), with varying slopes and intercepts, gen-
erating 1000 random walks for each boundary (in both Easy
and Mixed conditions).
Figure C1(a) shows a comparison between true and
estimated slopes in Easy games when σdri f t = 0, i.e. there
was no trial-to-trial variability in drift, as well as when
σdri f t = 0.35, i.e. there was a large trial-to-trial drift variabil-
ity. When there was no trial-to-trial variability in drift, the
estimated slopes were close to true slopes. In the presence of
drift variability, the magnitude of slopes was systematically
overestimated. However, constant slopes were still estimated
as constant and increasing or decreasing slopes were also es-
timated as increasing or decreasing, respectively. Thus, ir-
respective of trial-to-trial variability in drift rates, a negative
estimate of slope indicated that the true slope was also nega-
tive.
Figure C1(b) shows a comparison between true and
estimated difference in slopes for σdri f t = 0 and σdri f t =
0.35. In the presence of drift variability, the bias in estimation
of slopes results in a bias in estimation of difference in slopes,
with the magnitude of estimated difference being larger than
true difference. The estimated difference in slopes is approx-
imately proportional to the true difference for both σdri f t = 0
andσdri f t = 0.35. Therefore, when there was no difference in
true slopes, there was also no difference in estimated slopes.
Similarly, when true difference in slopes was positive (neg-
ative), the estimated difference in slopes was also positive
(negative). Therefore, even when there was trial-to-trial vari-
ability in drift, the estimated difference in slopes indicated a
difference in true slopes.
We also checked whether our inferences were robust
to loss of information in the integrative decision process. To
do this, we simulated data from the binomial loss model
(Smith & Vickers, 1989), where observations δX available
to the decision-maker are only accumulated with some fixed
probability pa, otherwise they are lost:
Vt+1 =
Vt + δX + ξ with probability paVt + ξ with probability 1 − pa (10)
where Vt and ξ are defined in the same way as Equation 9.
Figure C2(a) compares the estimates of slopes during Easy
games for 200 simulated participants from the information
loss model (Equation 10, pa = 0.7) with 200 simulated par-
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Figure C1. The effect of trial-to-trial variability in drift on estimation of slopes of decision boundary. Panel (a) shows a
comparison of true and estimated slopes in a Single-difficulty task ( = 0.22). Panel (b) shows a comparison of true and
estimated difference in slope during an Easy ( = 0.22) and Mixed ( = 0.22/0) task. In both panels, each dot represents
a participant simulated using a rise-to-threshold model with no trial-to-trial drift and crosses represent participants simulated
using a rise-to-threshold model with a large trial-to-trial variability in drift (σdri f t = 0.35).
ticipants from the rise-to-threshold model without any infor-
mation loss (Equation 9). Introducing information loss re-
sulted in some systematic biases: estimated slopes were, in
general, larger and shifted in the positive direction so that
constant slopes were estimated to have a small positive value
and slightly negative slopes were estimated to be constant
while large negative and positive slopes were estimated to
have a larger value than the true slopes. Note the direction
of this bias – when slopes were estimated to be negative (as
in the majority of experiments in this study), the true slopes
were also negative while when they were estimated to be pos-
itive, they could in fact be constant. This makes sense: the
total information loss will increase over time and since the
drift is positive, decisions made at later points of time will
seem to be at higher levels of evidence than internally inte-
grated.
Figure C2(b) compares the true and estimated differ-
ence in slopes between Easy and Mixed games. When in-
formation was lost, the estimate of slopes in each type of
game was biased, therefore, the estimate for difference in
slopes was also biased. However, the estimated difference in
slopes was still approximately proportional to true difference
in slopes, passing through the origin so that the estimated
difference in slopes was proportional to the true difference in
slopes even when data were simulated from the binomial loss
model.
Appendix D
Model selection and recovery
A key finding of Experiments 1 and 2 is that participants
seem to decrease their decision boundaries with time, espe-
cially in the Mixed-difficulty condition. In order to check the
robustness of this result, we compared the logistic regression
model presented in the main text (Equation 2), which uses
both evidence and time to predict the probability of go, with
a simpler model that uses only evidence to predict this prob-
ability:
log
P(A = go)
P(A = wait)
= β0 + βX ∗ X (11)
where βX is the regression coefficient for evidence and β0
is the intercept. Note that this simpler model is equivalent
to assuming that decision boundaries do not change with
time as only evidence predicts whether a participant chooses
the action wait or go during a trial. We inferred the pre-
ferred model for each participant and condition by com-
puting the Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC) for each
model (Schwarz, 1978; Wagenmakers, 2007). Following
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Figure C2. The effect of information loss on estimation of slopes of decision boundary. Panel (a) shows a comparison of true
and estimated slopes in a Single-difficulty task ( = 0.22). Panel (b) shows a comparison of true and estimated difference in
slope during an Easy ( = 0.22) and Mixed ( = 0.22/0) task. In both panels, each dot represents a participant simulated
using a rise-to-threshold model without any information loss and crosses represent a participant simulated using a binomial
loss model (pa = 0.7).
Wasserman (2000) and Hawkins et al. (2015), we approxi-
mated the posterior probability for a participant using each
model under the assumption that both models are a priori
equally likely:
PBIC(Mi|Data) =
exp(− 12 BIC(Mi))∑m
j=1 exp(− 12 BIC(M j))
(12)
Figure D1 plots these posterior probabilities for data
from both single-difficulty (left column) and mixed-difficulty
conditions (right column) for each participant. Shaded (red)
bars show the posterior model probability for the more com-
plex model (using both evidence and time), while the while
hatched bars show the complementary posterior probability
for the simpler model (only on evidence).
In agreement with the slopes estimated using the line
of indifference (Figures 5 and 8), we found that the model
using both evidence and time provided the best account of
the data in Experiments 1, 2a and 2b. This was especially
true for the Mixed-difficulty games. Note that, in spite of
the fact that the BIC rewards lower model complexity, the
simpler model of Equation 11 provided the best account for
only 5 participants during the Mixed-difficulty trials during
these experiments. Data from most other participants was
better accounted for by the model using time as an additional
predictor variable.
In contrast, during Experiments 2c and 2d, where the
inter-trial intervals were same for correct and incorrect deci-
sions and reward landscapes were flatter (Figure 9), support
for the two models was much more mixed. Finally, during
Experiment 3, where the reward landscape favoured constant
(or slightly increasing) decision boundaries with time (Fig-
ures 10 and 11), the simpler model, using only evidence to
predict probability of going, provided the best account of the
data, especially in the Mixed-difficulty condition.
We checked the validity of this model selection pro-
cedure using a model recovery analysis. We simulated deci-
sions using two noisy accumulation to threshold models (see
Equation 5 in Appendix B above). The first model used a
constant threshold, while the second one used a threshold
that decreased linearly with time. For each simulated par-
ticipant, we generated 100 random walks with drifts drawn,
with uniform probability, from the set  ∈ {0.22, 0}. Thus,
these simulated random walks approximately matched the
data collected and conditions for Mixed-difficulty trials in
Experiment 2.
We then fit the two logistic regression models dis-
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Figure D1. Each row shows the posterior model probability for the logistic regression models using only evidence as the
predictor (hatched) and using both time and evidence as predictors (shaded, red) for all participants in an experiment. The left
and right-hand columns show these posterior probabilities during the Single and Mixed-difficulty conditions, respectively.
cussed above, one using only evidence as a predictor (Equa-
tion 11) and the other using evidence as well as time (Equa-
tion 2), to each of these simulated participants and computed
the BIC values for each fit. Each plot in Figure D2 shows
the distribution of difference in BIC values for 400 simu-
lated participants, 200 of which are simulated using the fixed
boundary model (hatched distribution), while the remain-
ing 200 are simulated using the decreasing boundary model
(shaded distribution). It can be seen from these plots that the
decisions generated using a fixed boundary model are better
fit (lower BIC f ix) by the logistic regression model using only
evidence as the predictor, while the decisions generated us-
ing a decreasing boundary model are better fit (lower BICvar)
by the logistic regression model using both evidence as time
as predictors. Furthermore, when the slope of the decision
boundaries is increased for the simulated decisions, the dif-
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Figure D2. Each plot shows the distribution of difference in BIC values for fixed boundary model (only evidence used as pre-
dictor) and variable boundary model (both evidence and time used as predictors). Hatched distributions show this difference
in BIC values when decisions are simulated using integration of evidence to a fixed boundary (inset, dashed line) and shaded
(red) distributions show the difference in BIC values when decisions are simulated from integration to a decreasing boundary
(inset, solid line). Three different slopes are used for decreasing boundaries (a) 15 degrees, (b) 30 degrees and (c) 60 degrees.
ference in BIC values increases (compare the shaded region
in the three plots), showing that the BIC of the time-varying
bounds model decreases with increase in the slope used to
generate the decisions.
